The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages by Miller, Russ
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 54 
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 2001 Article 6 
11-2001 
The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and State 
Laws Against the Direct Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages 
Russ Miller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Russ Miller, The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-first Amendment and State Laws Against the Direct 
Shipment of Alcoholic Beverages, 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 2495 (2001) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol54/iss6/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
The Wine Is in the Mail: The Twenty-
first Amendment and State Laws
Against the Direct Shipment of
Alcoholic Beverages
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 2496
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE ALCOHOL
REGULATION .................................................................... 2501
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Background .............. 2501
B. Pre-Prohibition Alcohol Regulation ...................... 2503
C. Passage of the Twenty-first Amendment and Early
Interpretation ....................................................... 2512
III. BALANCING INTERESTS: CURRENT ANALYSIS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT ............................................ 2517
A. Developing the Balancing Test: Midcal Aluminum
and Capital Cities Cable ...................................... 2517
B. Shifting Analysis: Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
D ias ...................................................................... 2519
C. An Overview of the Supreme Court's Framework
of A nalysis ............................................................ 2523
D. Applying the Bacchus Imports Element ................ 2527
1. Supreme Court Analysis: North Dakota v.
United States ............................................. 2528
2. Lower Court Analysis ................................ 2530
IV. THE DIRECT SHIPMENT ISSUE .......................................... 2533
A. Law Against Direct Shipment ............................... 2533
B. Lower Court Analysis of Direct Shipment Laws ... 2534
C. The Supreme Court's Possible Approach to Direct
Shipment Laws ..................................................... 2541
V. ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 2543
2495
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:2495
A. Problems with the Court's Twenty-first Amend-
ment Framework .................................................. 2543
B. Powers Not Purposes ............................................ 2548
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................... 2551
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has revolutionized commerce by providing an
easy way for businesses to reach vast numbers of customers, and by
allowing consumers to attain products of all sorts with the mere
click of a mouse. Some wine consumers, however, feel left behind by
the Internet revolution. State laws against the direct shipment of
alcohol leave them frustrated because they cannot purchase wine
online and have it shipped to their homes.1 These laws against di-
rect shipment have attracted a significant amount of attention in
the news media, 2 and they have recently been challenged in a num-
ber of federal courts.
3
To understand the direct shipment issue fully, it is necessary
to understand the purpose of direct shipment laws and the role they
play in states' alcohol regulation schemes. All fifty states regulate
the importation and distribution of alcohol in some way.4 Some
states, like Pennsylvania, have state run monopolies whereby all
1. For an example, a consumer can go to www.wine.com and attempt to have a bottle of
wine shipped into the state of Tennessee. The website will inform the consumer that
www.wine.com is unable to ship wine into the state because of state laws against the direct
shipment of alcohol to consumers.
2. See, e.g., Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, A Vineyard Breaks the Mold, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at Al; Benjamin Weiser, Challenge to Wine Sale Law Can Proceed in U.S.
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2000, at B3.
3. Lawsuits have been filed or decided in over half of the federal circuits. See Bridenbaugh
v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Indiana's direct shipment law
constitutional, reversing the district court), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672 (2001); Bolick v. Roberts,
No. 99CV755, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11118, at *108-09 (E.D. Va. July 27, 2001) (holding Vir-
ginia's statutory scheme regarding distilled spirits constitutional, but holding the scheme for
wine and beer in violation of the Commerce Clause); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306,
1315 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that Florida's direct shipment law violates the dormant com-
merce clause principle of nondiscrimination, but is nonetheless constitutional because the regu-
lation falls within the "core concerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment), affd, 253 F.3d 711 (11th
Cir. 2001); Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 710 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (declaring Texas's direct
shipment law unconstitutional); Sweedenburg v. Kelly, No. 00 CV 778 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.) (pend-
ing); Beskind v. Easley, No. 3:00-CV-258-MU (W.D.N.C.) (pending); Heald v. Engler, No. 00-CV-
71438-DT (E.D. Mich.) (pending). For copies of the pleadings for these pending cases, see Wine
and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., Overview of Challenges to State's (sic] Rights Under
the 21st Amendment, at http://www.wswa.org/litigation (last updated Oct. 2, 2001).
4. Anne Faircloth, Mail-order Wine Buyers, Beware!, FORTUNE, Feb. 15, 1998, at 46.
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alcohol is sold and distributed through state owned stores.5 Most
states, however, allow private wholesalers and retailers to sell and
distribute alcohol pursuant to state-issued licenses. 6 States that
allow private, licensed sales and distribution have a three-tier sys-
tem of distribution.7 Under these three-tier systems, alcohol suppli-
ers (tier one) are permitted to sell their products only to licensed
wholesalers (tier two). The wholesalers collect excise taxes from the
suppliers and provide the state with information about the suppli-
ers -and the alcohol that they import.8 The wholesalers then sell the
alcohol to licensed retail outlets within the state (tier three), and
make a profit by charging a higher price than they paid to the sup-
pliers.9 The retailers then sell the alcohol to consumers. 10
State laws prohibiting the direct shipment of alcohol protect
the integrity of these state distribution systems by prohibiting al-
cohol suppliers from shipping alcohol directly to in-state consumers
without going through the three-tier system." Consequently, under
most state alcohol regulation schemes, there are only two ways in
which in-state or out-of-state sellers of alcoholic beverages may sell
alcohol to in-state consumers: (1) by obtaining a license from the
state to do so, 12 or (2) by shipping the beverages through the three-
5. Kim Marcus, When Winenmakers Become Criminals, WINE SPECTATOR, May 15, 1997, at
68-70, 73-74. States with state run monopolies that sell alcohol to consumers are Alabama,
Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. RICHARD McGOWAN,
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY: THE SEARCH FOR REVENUE AND THE
COIMION GOOD 52 (1997); John Foust, Note, State Power to Regulate Alcohol Under the Twenty-
first Amendment: The Constitutional Implications of the Twenty.first Amendment Enforcement
Act, 41 B.C. L. REV. 659, 666 n.48 (2000).
6. See Susan E. Brownlee, Economic Protection for Retail Liquor Dcalers Residency Re-
quirements and the Twenty-first Amendment, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 317, 317 (stating that as
of 1990 "thirty-four states are 'license states' which permit state.licensed, privately owned stores
to make off-premises sales"); see also MCGOWAN, supra note 5, at 102 (describing state practices);
Foust, supra note 5, at 666 n.49 (same).
7. See infra notes 245-50 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Courtes treat-
ment of the three-tier system used by states).
8. Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., What Is Wholesaling, at
http//:www.wswa.org/whole/whatwhol.htm (Nov. 4, 2000).
9. Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce Clause, and the
Twenty-first Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353, 361 (1999). Shanker argues that wholesalers can
charge monopoly prices because they are the only source from which alcohol may be purchased.
Id.
10. Id. at 355.
11. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5 (2000) (It is unlawful for a person in the business of
selling alcoholic beverages in another state or country to ship or cause to be shipped an alcoholic
beverage directly to an Indiana resident who does not hold a valid wholesaler permit under this
title. This includes the ordering and selling of alcoholic beverages over a computer network.").
12. These licenses could take the form of wholesaler or retailer licenses, permitting the
seller himself to serve as a seller or retailer, or the form of a small winery permit or some other
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 54:2495
tier system. Many states restrict licenses to in-state residents, 13
leaving out-of-state suppliers with the only option of sending their
products through the three-tier system.
There are three basic types of direct shipment laws. 14
Twenty-nine states have "express prohibition" statutes that entirely
prohibit direct shipment to consumers by any supplier without a
permit. 15 Nine states and the District of Columbia allow "limited
direct shipment," which generally permits direct shipment to con-
sumers in small quantities.16 Twelve states have "reciprocals" with
other states, which authorize direct shipment from suppliers in
states that reciprocate the direct shipment privilege to its state
suppliers. 17
Groups on both sides of the direct shipment debate have very
strong interests in this issue. If alcohol suppliers could circumvent
the three-tier system of distribution, they could sell directly to cus-
tomers without having to pay excise taxes or have their products
subjected to wholesaler and retailer price markups.18 On the other
license that would allow the seller to sell directly to an in-state customer. Some states have small
farm winery permits whereby certain in-state wineries may ship wine directly to consumers. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 7.1-3-12-5(a)(5) (2000) (providing exemption for direct shipping by in-state
winery). These exemptions undoubtedly give in-state wineries a discriminatory advantage over
out-of-state wineries because they allow in-state wineries to avoid the wholesaler and retailer
price mark-ups.
13. The states that impose residency restrictions on the grant of retailer licenses are
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Wis-
consin. See Brownlee, supra note 6, at 317 n.3.
14. See Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate State Regulation of Interstate Commerce in
Alcoholic Beverages, 49 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1648-49 (2000) (providing a comprehensive review of the
types of direct shipment statutes).
15. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kan-
sas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. at 1649 n.136 (providing all
statutory cites); see also Wine Institute, Direct Shipment Laws by State for Wineries, at
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/analysis/state-analysis.html (last modified Aug. 31,
2001).
16. These states are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Rhode Island. See Douglass, supra note 14,
at 1648 n.134.
17. These states are California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Mexico, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id. at 1648 n.135. These stat-
utes allow direct shipments only from states that reciprocate the privilege of allowing direct
shipment into their state.
18. Recent estimates suggest that the direct shipment business is now close to a $1 billion
dollar a year industry. W. John Moore, Sour Grapes on Capitol Hill, NAT'L J. Nov. 29, 1997,
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hand, wholesalers and retailers have an equally strong interest in
preventing the direct shipment of alcohol. Laws forbidding the di-
rect shipment of alcohol ensure that licensed wholesalers and re-
tailers will not face competition from other distributors. 19 Finally,
states have a significant interest in forbidding the direct shipment
of alcohol.20 The three-tier system facilitates tax collection 2 by en-
suring that every drop of alcohol sold to state residents is taxed.2 If
suppliers can circumvent the three-tier system, and thereby state
tax schemes, then states will obviously lose revenue. 23
Recent cases challenging state laws against direct shipment
require courts to consider the relationship between the dormant
commerce clause, which generally prohibits states from favoring in-
state industries over out-of-state industries, 24 and the Twenty-first
Amendment, which repealed national prohibition, thereby return-
ing a substantial amount of control over alcohol regulation to the
states.25 Challengers claim that laws prohibiting the direct ship-
ment of alcohol violate the dormant commerce clause principle of
nondiscrimination because they prevent out-of-state alcohol suppli-
ers from competing with in-state alcohol suppliers and distribu-
tors.26 In defense of direct shipment laws, states and wholesalers
argue that the Twenty-first Amendment gives states broad regula-
tory power over alcohol, and permits states to discriminate against
out-of-state interests in certain situations. Thus far, three district
courts have ruled on direct shipment laws, two of which have held
them to be unconstitutional. 27 In the only federal appellate decision
2424, 2424; see also Shanker, supra note 9, at 354 n.5 (citing estimates that the direct shipment
industry is between $300 million and $1 billion in size).
19. Shanker, supra note 9, at 361-62.
20. MCGOWAN, supra note 5, at 114.
21. "In 1994, federal, state, and local governments received over $18.6 billion in revenues
from alcohol beverage taxes and fees." Florida alone collects nearly $1 billion in taxes annually
from the sale of alcoholic beverages. Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1309 n.3 (MD.
Fla. 2001).
22. Shanker, supra note 9, at 356.
23. In 1997, New York State Attorney General, Dennis Vacco estimated that New York was
losing up to $100 million dollars annually in sales and excise taxes because of direct shipment to
consumers. New York Declares War on Online 'Bootleggers, MEDIA DAILY, Dec. 15, 1997, avail-
able at 1997 WL 14506771. "Some states estimate excise tax losses as high as $600 million."
Moore, supra note 18, at 2424.
24. See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text (offering a more complete discussion of the
dormant commerce clause).
25. See infra Part ll.B (discussing the history that led up to the Twenty-first Amendment).
26. See infra Part IV (discussing the legal issues in the direct shipment context).
27. See Bolick v. Roberts, No. 99CV755, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11118, at *108-09 (E.D. Va.
July 27, 2001) (holding Virginia's statutory scheme regarding distilled spirits constitutional but
the scheme for wine and beer in violation of the Commerce Clause); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F.
2001] 2499
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on the direct shipment issue to date, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the district court and held that while the Twenty-first Amendment
does not give states the power to discriminate against out-of-state
industries, Indiana's direct shipment law did not have a discrimina-
tory effect.
28
Before fully analyzing the current direct shipment issue, it
will be helpful to understand the legal framework in which the is-
sue has developed. Thus, Part II of this Note briefly explains the
principles of the dormant commerce clause and provides an in-
depth review of the history of state alcohol regulation. Part II also
reviews the Supreme Court's early interpretation of the Twenty-
first Amendment. In Part III, this Note examines the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment, and
develops a framework that attempts to clarify the Court's often con-
fusing Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV analyzes
how lower courts have addressed the direct shipment issue, and
hypothesizes how the Supreme Court might decide direct shipment
cases under its current framework. Part V provides a critique of the
Court's existing framework of analysis and advocates adopting a
method of analysis similar to Judge Easterbrook's Seventh Circuit
opinion. Finally, in Part VI, this Note applies the suggested method
of analysis to the direct shipment issue, and addresses the resi-
dency restrictions question that was not presented to Judge Easter-
brook. In sum, this Note argues that direct shipment laws by them-
selves are constitutional, but that when states pass laws against
direct shipment in conjunction with residency requirements for li-
censes, state regulatory schemes become unconstitutional.
Supp. 2d 1306, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding that Florida's direct shipment law violates the
dormant commerce clause principle of nondiscrimination, but is nonetheless constitutional be-
cause the regulation falls within the "core concerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment); Bri.
denbaugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (holding Indiana direct shipment law
unconstitutional), rev'd sub nom. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672 (2001); see also Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 704 (S.D.
Tex. 2000) (ruling originally that the Texas direct shipment law was unconstitutional, but deny-
ing plaintiffs motion for entry of final judgment and ordering briefs to be submitted in light of
the Seventh Circuifs decision in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000)).
See infra Part IV.B for a more complete discussion of these cases.
28. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1672 (2001).
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II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE STATE ALCOHOL
REGULATION
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Background
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution reads: Congress shall
have the power "[tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. " 2 The Su-
preme Court has interpreted this clause as possessing a dual na-
ture. 30 First, the clause grants Congress an affirmative power to
regulate commerce among the states.3 1 This facet is commonly
known as the affirmative commerce clause. 32 Second, and less clear
from the text, the clause prohibits individual states from regulating
interstate commerce. 33 This aspect of the clause acts as a restriction
on states even in the absence of an affirmative exercise of the com-
merce power by Congress; thus, this element is called the dormant
commerce clause. 34
There are essentially two ways in which a state can run
afoul of the dormant commerce clause: (1) by giving economic ad-
vantage to in-state industry at the expense of out-of-state indus-
try;35 or (2) by passing a statute that, while not discriminatory,
places significant burdens on interstate commerce. 36 Courts review
statutes that facially discriminate against an out-of-state industry
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
30. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 279 n.5 (1984) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (CThe Commerce Clause operates both as a grant of power to the Congress and a limita-
tion on the power of the States.").
31. Id.
32. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1998) (us-
ing the term "affirmative Commerce powers" in contrast with the dormant commerce clause).
33. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949) (asserting that the
pre-constitutional history lends support to the idea that the Framers intended the Commerce
Clause to include negative components limiting state power).
34. See generally, e.g., Camps Newfoundl/watonna, 520 U.S. at 564 (using the term "dor-
mant commerce clause" throughout). Three justifications are traditionally asserted for the neces-
sity of a dormant commerce clause. First, a common, uniform market is preferable to a system of
"economic balkanization." Second, the nation's economy is better served by a system of less re-
stricted trade. Third, the dormant commerce clause protects out-of-state interests, which are not
represented in-state legislatures. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M SULLIVAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261-62 (13th ed. 1997); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1112-13
(1986); Foust, supra note 5, at 672-73.
35. A clear example of this type of discriminatory statute would be one that places a tax on
an out-of-state product, but does not tax the comparable in-state products. See, eg., Bacchus
Imports, 468 U.S. at 268.
36. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1970).
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in favor of in-state industry, also known as protectionist statutes,3 7
with a very high level of scrutiny.8 To survive this high standard of
review, the state must show that the discriminatory statute serves
a legitimate local purpose that is unachievable by less restrictive
means.3 9 Nondiscriminatory statutes that only incidentally burden
commerce are held constitutional unless, "the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits."
40
C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown provides a good exam-
ple of the Court's analysis in determining whether a statute is dis-
criminatory or protectionist. 4 1 In C & A Carbone, the town of Clark-
stown, New York, passed a "flow control ordinance," which required
all nonrecyclable solid waste in the town to be processed by a local,
private contractor. 42 The town argued that there was no discrimina-
tion between in-state and out-of-state industries because all nonre-
cyclable solid waste, whether produced in-state or out-of-state, had
to be processed by the local contractor before leaving the town.
Thus, the town argued that it treated all in-state and out-of-state
garbage equally.43 The Court rejected this argument, however, not-
ing that the relevant article of commerce was not the garbage itself,
but rather the service of processing it.44 Out-of-state garbage proc-
essors were discriminated against because they were not allowed to
compete for the privilege of processing the town's garbage. 4 Thus,
the Court held that the law constituted protectionist discrimination
against out-of-state processors. 46
37. These statutes are "protectionist" because they protect in-state industry from out-of-
state competition. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276 (describing a Hawaii law that gave Ha-
waii industry a tax break, not given to out-of-state industry, as "mere economic protectionism").
38. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). The only Supreme
Court case in which a discriminatory action was not declared invalid was Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131 (1986).
39. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
40. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
41. See generally 511 U.S. 383. The C & A Carbone case is particularly relevant because it
helps explain a key point of the direct shipment issue. See discussion infra notes 390-92 and
accompanying text.
42. 511U.S. at 389.
43. Id. at 390.
44. Id. at 390-91.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 392.
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Statutes need not be discriminatory or protectionist to vio-
late the dormant commerce clause. 47 Nondiscriminatory statutes,
however, are subject to a lower level of scrutiny than discriminatory
statutes.48 The Court will find a nondiscriminatory statute uncon-
stitutional only if "the burden on interstate commerce clearly ex-
ceeds the local benefits. 49
B. Pre-Prohibition Alcohol Regulation
States have long struggled to gain control over alcohol sales
and distribution, often finding that the dormant commerce clause
restricts such control. In 1847, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
New Hampshire were the first states whose attempts to regulate
alcohol came under dormant commerce clause attack.~0 In an effort
to reduce alcohol consumption within their borders, these three
states passed laws requiring a license to sell alcohol. 51 In the Li-
cense Cases, alcohol sellers attacked these laws, arguing that they
violated the dormant commerce clause because they placed a bur-
den on the movement of interstate commerce.5 2 While the Court
unanimously rejected this Commerce Clause argument, the Justices
could not agree on one single rationale for their holding.53 Each of
the opinions, though, manifested a view in favor of broad state au-
47. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
The statute in Brown-Forman Distillers essentially set a ceiling on the price of liquor sold in the
state of New York. Id. at 575. The statute had an effect on interstate commerce because it regu-
lated the price out-of-state alcohol sellers could charge for their product in New York; in other
words, it placed a burden on out-of-state sellers. Id. The statute did not discriminate, however,
because it placed the same burden on in-state alcohol sellers. Id. at 579.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390.
50. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 573 (1847). These cases are commonly referred
to as the License Cases, and this Note will refer to them as such hereinafter.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The Court produced six separate opinions in this case. Over forty years later, the
Supreme Court accurately summarized the six opinions as follows: (1) all of the Justices agreed
that the statutes were not per se invalid because they had some effect on interstate commerce;
(2) all of the Justices agreed that Congress had not endeavored to regulate the area with which
the state statutes dealt; (3) some of the Justices, including the Chief Justice, held that articles of
commerce were subject to the exclusive regulation of Congress if Congress chose to act, which
Congress had not done; and (4) the other Justices stated that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce ceased once the article entered the state, that is, that state police power, in effect
trumped the commerce power of Congress. Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S.
465, 478-79 (1888).
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thority over the sale of alcohol, authority that was relatively unre-
stricted by the dormant commerce clause.
54
As temperance movements became stronger and more uni-
fied,55 activists pushed for even stricter state alcohol regulation. In
1880, Kansas took the particularly bold step of amending its consti-
tution to prohibit the manufacture and sale of liquor within the
state.5 6 A Kansas brewer challenged this amendment in the 1887
case of Muglar v. Kansas.57 The Supreme Court found that it was
within a state's police power to prohibit the production and sale of
alcohol in the state.58 The Court did not address the Commerce
Clause challenge, however, because there was no evidence that the
brewer in the case intended to ship liquor across state lines.59 Fol-
lowing the License Cases and Muglar, states appeared to have full
authority over alcohol: Muglar held that states could go so far as to
outlaw the sale of in-state liquor, and the License Cases allowed
states to restrict the import and sale of all out-of-state liquor.
Following the Civil War, however, the Court moved away from the
strong states' rights position that it had adopted in the License
54. See 8 OWEN FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 269 (1993) ('When taken together, the six
opinions in the License Cases were a resounding challenge to economic nationalism and an im-
plicit endorsement of the view of federalism that emphasized local consensus."); see also Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205 (1976) ("In the License Cases, the Court recognized a broad authority in
state governments to regulate the trade of alcoholic beverages within their borders free from
implied restrictions under the Commerce Clause.") (citation omitted).
55. Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over In-
toxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 161, 169 (1991) (noting
that the National Prohibition Party began in 1869 and the Women's Christian Temperance Un-
ion began in 1874).
56. The amendment stated, 'The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors shall be for-
ever prohibited in this State, except for medical, scientific, and mechanical purposes." KAN.
CONST. art. XV, § 10 (repealed 1947), quoted in Muglar v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 623 (1887). For
a review of the interesting history that led to the enactment of the amendment in Kansas, see
NORMAN H. CLARK, DELIVER US FROM EVIL: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN PROHIBITION 73-
74 (1976).
57. Muglar v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 653, 657 (1887).
58. Id. at 661-63. After noting that the police power allowed states to pass laws protecting
"public morals, public health, or the public safety," the Court stated that it is "within the knowl-
edge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, may be endangered
by the general use of intoxicating drinks." Id. at 661-62.
59. Id. at 674 ('[There is no intimation in the record that the beer which the respective de-
fendants manufactured was intended to be carried out of the State or to foreign countries."). The
Court, however, alluded that it would have to decide the Commerce Clause issue eventually. Id.
("And, without expressing an opinion as to whether such facts would have constituted a good
defense, we observe that it will be time enough to decide a case of that character when it shall
come before us.").
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Cases, and instead endorsed visions of greater economic union.60
Consequently, state authority over alcohol once again came under
attack.
61
In the 1880s, Iowa, seeking to control alcohol importation
without entirely banning it, passed a law that required anyone im-
porting alcohol for resale to obtain a permit from the county audi-
tor.62 This law was challenged in Bowman v. Chicago and North-
western Railway Co. 63 The permit law in Bowman was distinct from
the permit law in the License Cases.64 While the law in the License
Cases required a license to sell imported liquor, the law in Bowman
required a license merely to import it.65 Thus, the law in Bowman
unquestionably regulated interstate commerce because it regulated
alcohol that was not yet within the state.66 The state's primary pur-
pose, however, was to protect its citizens from alcohol's perceived
evils, which was considered a legitimate use of state police power.6
This distinction forced the Court to address the question of whether
the dormant commerce clause outweighed the state police power
when the two conflicted.68 The Court held that a state could not ex-
ercise its police power over alcohol in a way that violated the dor-
mant commerce clause. 6
9
The Bowman Court did not opine as to whether states re-
tained the authority to regulate the sale of imported liquor after it
was received in the state.70 Just weeks after the Bowman decision,
Iowa passed a law banning the sale of liquor, whether produced in-
60. See FISS, supra note 54, at 266. That this was true is clearly seen in Welton u. Missouri,
91 U.S. 275 (1876). In that case, the Court firmly held that congressional silence in a particular
area of commercial regulation should be interpreted as an airmative congressional statement
that Congress wanted that particular area of commerce to be free from regulation. Id. at 282.
61. See FISS, supra note 54, at 266.
62. IOWA CODE § 1553 (as amended in 1886), cited in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 474 (1888). The law actually accomplished the permit requirement by
forbidding any common carrier from delivering alcohol to anyone not possessing a permit. Id.; see
also RICHARD F. HAAs, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENt. TFMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL
CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, at 63 (1995) (discussing permit practices).
63. 125 U.S. 465, 474 (1888).
64. Id. at 476 ("The statute in the License Cases] ... applied to intoxicating liquor imported
from another State, and the decision in that case upheld its validity in reference to the disposi-
tion by sale... of the intoxicating liquor after it had been brought into the State.").
65. Id.
66. Id. at 479.
67. Id. at 475-76.
68. Id. at 476; see also Fiss, supra note 54, at 271 (discussing dormant commerce clause).
69. Bowman, 125 U.S. at 500 ("[IThe power to regulate or forbid the sale of a commodity, af-
ter it has been brought into the State, does not carry with it the right and power to prevent its
introduction by transportation from another state.").
70. The Bowman Court itself noted that it was not deciding this issue, but it seemed to al-
lude to its ultimate conclusion that states could not prohibit sale after importation. Id. at 499.
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state or imported. 71 John Leisy, an agent for an Illinois alcohol firm
who was arrested for selling imported liquor in unbroken, original
containers, challenged the Iowa law.72 This challenge addressed the
questions left unanswered both in Bowman-whether a state had
the authority to regulate the sale of imported liquor-and in Mug-
lar-whether a total ban on the sale of alcohol violated the dormant
commerce clause. In Leisy v. Hardin, the Court established a broad
rule of free trade among the states, 73 holding that alcohol remained
an article of interstate commerce outside a state's regulatory reach,
so long as the alcohol stayed in its original package. 74 States could
not prohibit the sale of the alcohol in original packages, 75 thus pre-
venting states from regulating the importation or the sale of out-of-
state alcohol.
76
The Leisy decision, in combination with Muglar, created a
peculiar situation for two reasons. First, the Muglar Court seemed
to give states the power to choose to be dry, but the Leisy Court
rendered this impossible because it allowed alcohol to be imported
and sold into the state. 77 Out-of-state liquor dealers did not hesitate
to take advantage of this system and soon employed agents in pro-
hibition states to receive shipments of alcohol in original packages
and sell it on the spot to customers, effectively running saloons in
dry states.78 Second, the combination of Muglar and Leisy created a
situation in which a state choosing to regulate the sale of alcohol
was forced to discriminate against its in-state alcohol industry.
79
States could require in-state sellers to have a license to manufac-
ture and sell alcohol within its borders, but they could not regulate
71. See Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1889).
72. See HAMM, supra note 62, at 67; Spaeth, supra note 55, at 171-72.
73. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 124; see 9 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JuDIcIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-1921, at 440
(1985); FISS, supra note 54, at 273.
74. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 124. "Original package" simply means that the alcohol is in an un-
opened container.
75. Id. at 124-25.
76. Id. CUnder our decision in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., they had
the right to import this beer into that State, and in the view which we have expressed they had
the right to sell it.").
77. See FISS, supra note 54, at 272-73 CAs long as liquor could be shipped into a dry state
from a sister state or foreign country, the consumption of liquor would continue.").
78. As one commentator noted, "Within a month of the [Leisy] ruling, 'original package
houses' and 'supreme court saloons' had sprung up in every prohibition state." HAMM supra note
62, at 69.
79. See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 1672 (2001).
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out-of-state purveyors of alcohol without violating the dormant
commerce clause.
The Leisy Court, perhaps recognizing the conundrum that it
had created for states wishing to regulate alcohol, repeatedly noted
that Congress could take action under its commerce power to allow
states the right to regulate the importation of alcohol.80 Within four
months of the Leisy decision, Congress responded to this call to ac-
tion by passing the Wilson Act.8 1 The Wilson Act was not, however,
the sweeping prohibition bill that the prohibition movement had
hoped Congress would pass.8 2 The Wilson Act was passed as a
states' rights measure, not as a prohibition or temperance bill.8
3
Indeed, few supporters of the prohibition movement played any role
in the drafting or passage of the bill.8 The central players in the
passage of the Wilson Act were Republican congressmen working
more for states' rights than for temperance in general.8 5 Conse-
quently, the Senate debate centered not around prohibition or tem-
perance, but rather on national versus state authority.85 Senator
Wilson, the bill's author, characterized the original version of the
bill as being designed not to further temperance objectives, but
rather to give states the power "to do as they please in regard to the
80. The Court made statements throughout the opinion to this effect. "[]n the absence of
Congressional permission ... the State had no power." Leisy, 135 U.S. at 124. "Mhe States can-
not exercise that power without the assent of Congress." Id. at 119. Even liquor dealers saw an
ominous future revealed in the opinion; one Baltimore brewer expressed the sentiments of many
alcohol dealers, stating that the decision was 'bad for brewing as it will lead Congress to take
action that will make matters worse." HAIm, supra note 62, at 69.
81. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1994)). The
Act provided in pertinent part:
[L]iquor... transported into any State ... shall upon arrival in such State ...
be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State ... enacted in
the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner as
though such.., liquors had been produced in such State ... and shall not be
exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages.
82. HAMM, supra note 62, at 77-78, 88.
83. See id. at 78-82.
84. Id. at 78 ("The radical, abolitionist mind.set kept [prohibitionists] from fully promoting
the Wilson Bill; thus, the only prohibitionists who had any part in the shaping of the measure
were the few prohibitionists in Congress.).
85. Id. at 79 ("The Republican party, not prohibitionists, was chiefly responsible for the Wil-
son Act. The author of the bill, James Wilson, was a regular Republican and no temperance
fanatic.... Republicans dreaded the emergence of prohibition as a national question...
86. Id. at 81-82.
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liquor question."87 After the Wilson Act was passed, the Court
unanimously upheld its constitutionality in In re Rahrer.88
Importantly, the Wilson Act ended the system of reverse dis-
crimination by allowing states to regulate imported liquor "to the
same extent" as liquor produced within the state.89 As the text sug-
gests, however, the Wilson Act did not give states plenary power
over alcohol regulation; instead, it limited state power by the prin-
ciple of nondiscrimination. 90 Essentially, states could only regulate
out-of-state alcoholic beverage industries to the same extent, and
not to a greater extent, than the in-state alcohol industry. The
Court used this principle of nondiscrimination contained in the Wil-
son Act as the basis for its holding in Scott v. Donald.91 In Scott,
South Carolina enacted a statute that required all alcohol to be dis-
tributed through a state appointed commissioner. 92 The statute re-
quired that the commissioner purchase alcohol from South Carolina
brewers, 93 thus discriminating against out-of-state brewers. The
Court noted that the Wilson Act was not designed to allow states to
give their liquor industries advantage over alcohol industries in
other states. 94 According to the Court, the Wilson Act simply per-
mitted states to "provide equal regulations for the inspection and
sale of all domestic and imported liquors." 95
87. Id. at 80 (quoting CONG. REC., 50th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2882 (1888)). Senator Wilson also
stated that the bill allowed states to "have prohibition, high license, local option, or free liquor."
Id.
88. 140 U.S. 545, 562 (1891) ("No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide
that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests
them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not
within its competency to do so.").
89. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1994)); Bri.
denbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672
(2001).
90. That Congress did not give states the power to discriminate is clear from the text of the
Act, which only gave the power to regulate imports "to the same extent" as in-state alcohol. See
supra note 81.
91. 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
92. Id. at 66 n.1 (citing section three of the lengthy South Carolina liquor regulation stat-
ute).
93. Id. (citing section fifteen of the statute which provides that the "state commissioner
shall purchase his supplies from the brewers and distillers in this State when their product
reaches the standard required by this act"). The statute provided that if the South Carolina
alcohol was more expensive than out-of-state alcohol, then the commission could purchase from
out-of-state. Id.
94. Id. at 100 ("[The Wilson Act] was not intended to confer upon any State the power to
discriminate injuriously against the products of other States in articles whose manufacture and
use are not forbidden.").
95. Id.
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The Wilson Act undoubtedly overturned the Leisy decision
and allowed states to prohibit the sale of imported liquor, but some
questioned whether the Wilson Act also overturned Bowman and
allowed states to prohibit even the importation of liquor. This ques-
tion was crucial for states because if Bowman was left intact, then
states could only regulate the sale of imported liquor, but the dor-
mant commerce clause would still prevent them from regulating
importation itself.
Following the passage of the Wilson Act, Iowa reenacted the
law that the Court had struck down in Bowman, which provided
that a common carrier could not deliver alcohol to an unlicensed
person.96 Thus, when the law was challenged in Rhodes u. Iowa, the
Court was squarely confronted with the question of what impact the
Wilson Act had upon the Bowman decision.97 The Court noted that
the Wilson Act gave states the right to regulate liquor "upon arri-
val" into the state,98 and further held that liquor did not "arrive" in
a state until it was received by the consignee.99 Thus, states did not
have authority under the Wilson Act to prevent alcohol from being
imported into the state. 00 In other words, the Wilson Act left Bow-
man intact.101
Following the Rhodes decision, state efforts to regulate or
prohibit alcohol importation were again frustrated. 1' The Rhodes
Court's reading of the Wilson Act allowed out-of-state alcohol sell-
ers to circumvent state regulatory schemes by selling liquor via
mail order directly to consumers.103 By shipping directly to con-
sumer's homes, sellers avoided the only thing that the Wilson Act
prevented-the in-state sale; and following Rhodes, states had no
power to regulate importation alone.'1' This created an enormous
problem for dry states.0 5 An obvious solution to the problem would
96. See Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 418 (1898); HAE.M supra note 62, at 176.
97. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 419-20.
98. Id. at 421.
99. Id. at 426.
100. Id.; see also BICKEL, supra note 73, at 440 (discussing the Wilson Act); Fiss, supra note
54, at 279 (same).
101. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. "denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1672 (2001).
102. BICKEL, supra note 73, at 440; FISS, supra note 54, at 280 (Retail outlets were out-
lawed, only to be replaced by mail order companies.").
103. BICKEL, supra note 73, at 440; FISS, supra note 54, at 280.
104. BICKEL, supra note 73, at 440; FISS, supra note 54, at 280.
105. As one commentator noted, "The COD liquor shipments were ubiquitous; if the esti-
mates can be believed, a startling quantity of alcohol reached residents in prohibition territory.
In Kansas, a state with good records, it was estimated that 4.5 million gallons of liquor entered
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have been simply to declare the personal consumption of alcohol to
be illegal.106 For various reasons, though, most prohibitionists at
the time did not desire to take that step. 07 Instead, states once
again appealed to Congress for help, seeking the power to regulate
alcohol when it crossed the state border-before shipment to the
consignee. 0
8
In 1913, Congress answered the call and passed the Webb-
Kenyon Act ("Webb-Kenyon"), 10 9 which closed the mail order loop-
hole that Rhodes had created." 0 Webb-Kenyon appeared, on its
face, to take a different approach than the Wilson Act."' For one
thing, Webb-Kenyon did not contain the same nondiscrimination
language that the Wilson Act did." 2 When Congress enacted Webb-
Kenyon, however, it did not repeal the Wilson Act; therefore, it is
the state in 1914." HAMM, supra note 62, at 180. Members of Congress recognized the problem as
well:
Every State in which the traffic in liquors has been prohibited by law is deluged
with whisky sent in by people from other States under the shelter of the inter.
state-commerce law. There are daily trainloads of liquors in bottles, jugs, and
other packages sent into the State consigned to persons, real and fictitious, and
every railway station and every express company office in the State are con-
verted into the most extensive and active whisky shops, from which whisky is
openly distributed in great quantities. Liquor dealers in other States secure the
names of all persons in a community, and through the mails flood them with
advertisements of whiskey, with the most liberal and attractive propositions for
the sale and shipment of the same. Freed from the expense of the middleman,
the distiller or dealer in other States is enabled to sell to the individual in the
prohibition State at a less price than the purchaser formerly paid to the domes.
tic whiskey dealer. It is evident that under such circumstances the prohibition
law of a State is practically nullified, and intoxication liquors are imposed upon
its people against the will of the majority.
49 CONG. REC. 761 (1912) (statement of Sen. Kenyon, quoting Sen. Bacon from Geor-
gia), quoted in Spaeth, supra note 55, at 173 n.78.
106. HAMM, supra note 62, at 182 C'[I]f there were no legitimate reason to possess alcohol,
there could be no legal reason to import liquors-the consignees would always be liable to state
law.").
107. One explanation offered is that what troubled prohibitionists was not so much that
some people obtained liquor for personal consumption, but rather that "many lawless fellows
[got] it to sell." Id. Another possibility is that the political realities of the time did not make a ban
a personal consumption feasible. Id. Moreover, it is possible that such a law was unconstitu-
tional, or at least thought to be. See FIss, supra note 54, at 284.
108. Spaeth, supra note 55, at 173.
109. Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699 (1913) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1994)). The
Act provides in pertinent part: 'The shipment ... of intoxicating liquor.., into any State... in
violation of the law of such State... is hereby prohibited." Id.
110. See BICKEL, supra note 73, at 441.
111. See Noel T. Dowling & F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an Article of its Interstate Charac.
ter: An Examination of the Doctrine Underlying the Webb-Kenyon Act, 5 MINN. L. REV. 253, 264
(1921).
112. The Wilson Act provided that states could regulate out of state alcohol "to the same ex-
tent an in the same manner as though such... liquors had been produced in such State." Wilson
Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000)).
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reasonable to assume that Congress still desired that the nondis-
crimination principle limit state liquor regulation. Indeed, there is
good evidence that Congress sought in Webb-Kenyon simply to con-
fer upon the states the same power they had tried to give states un-
der the Wilson Act. 113
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Webb-
Kenyon in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co.1 14
In this case, the Court held that the purpose of Webb-Kenyon was
to prohibit brewers and alcohol distributors from using interstate
commerce immunity as a way of circumventing state law." 5 The
Court went on to enunciate how it perceived that Webb-Kenyon ac-
complished its purpose. The Court reiterated what Congress had
made clear: "[Webb-Kenyon] did not simply forbid the introduction
of liquor into a State for a prohibited use, but took the protection of
interstate commerce away"116 by divesting alcohol of its interstate
character entirely.117 The only remaining question for the Court was
whether Congress had the power to divest an article of its inter-
state nature. 18 This question was potentially very difficult for the
Court: If Congress could divest liquor of its interstate character,
then could it divest other articles of commerce of their interstate
character as well?119 The Court avoided answering' this question,
merely stating that liquor was of "exceptional nature," and there-
fore, required "the exceptional power exerted."1 20
States rightly viewed Webb-Kenyon and Clark Distilling Co.
as enormous victories. 12 1 States had finally regained the power that
Muglar and the License Cases had previously extended to them-
113. Regarding the Wilson Act's purpose, Senator Kenyon stated, "[States] could have prohi-
bition, high license, local option, or free liquor, as they please. It was the intention that each
State should be free to determine its own policy in regard to liquor traffic 49 CONG. REc. 828
(1912).
114. 242 U.S. 311, 325 (1917).
115. Id. at 324 C'[I]ts purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate com-
merce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in States contrary
to their laws, and thus, in effect afford a means by subterfuge and indirection to set such laws at
naught.").
116. Id. at 325 ("The movement of liquor in interstate commerce and the receipt and posses-
sion and right to sell prohibited by the state law having been in express terms divested by the
Webb-Kenyon Act of their interstate commerce character ... there is no possible reason for hold-
ing that to enforce the prohibitions of the state law would conflict with the commerce clause of
the Constitution.").
117. The title of the Webb-Kenyon Act was "An At divesting intoxicating liquors of their in-
terstate character in certain cases." See Dowling & Hubbard, supra note 111, at 261.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 332.
120. Id.
121. See FISS, supra note 54, at 291.
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the power to regulate effectively all alcohol within their borders,
both imported and domestic. For the active prohibitionists, how-
ever, state control over alcohol was no longer enough. Thus, they
started a movement for national prohibition. 122 Less than a year
after the Court's decision in Clark Distilling Co., Congress passed
the Eighteenth Amendment, which uniformly prohibited the manu-
facture and sale of liquor throughout the country. 123 Prohibition
lasted fourteen years until the Twenty-first Amendment was
passed, which returned the power to regulate alcohol to the
states. 124
C. Passage of the Twenty-first Amendment and Early Interpretation
The experience of national prohibition had engrained in the
nation a deep-seeded disdain for federal involvement in the regula-
tion of alcohol. 125 As a result, the Twenty-first Amendment's text
and history reveal a strong proclivity toward state regulation.1 26 As
initially proposed, the Twenty-first Amendment contained four sec-
tions: Section 1 repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, Sections 2
and 3 dealt with how alcohol would be regulated in the future, and
Section 4 called for state ratification. 127 Sections 2 and 3 of the
original proposed amendment engendered much debate in Con-
gress. Section 3 provided that Congress would have "concurrent
122. See id.; HAMM, supra note 62, at 227.
123. The Eighteenth Amendment provided, "After one year from the ratification of this arti-
cle the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XVIII.
124. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXI.
125. See Spaeth, supra note 55, at 176-78 (discussing some of the factors that led America to
the conclusion that "it was [a] dismal experience with prohibition under federal control that
contributed to sentiment both in Congress and in the states to insist on state control of liquor
upon repeal").
126. See id.
127. See id. at 180-81. The text of the original bill provides as follows:
Sec. One: The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the
United States is hereby repealed.
Sec. Two: The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Sec. Three: Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the
sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold.
Sec. Four: This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as
an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several states, as
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submis-
sion hereof to the States by the Congress.
Id. at 180 n.128.
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power" with the states to "regulate or prohibit" liquor. Congress,
however, dropped this section from the final bill, arguably because
it did not think that the federal government should retain a role in
alcohol regulation. 1
28
The proposed second section remained in the bill and became
Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. Section 2 follows the text
of Webb-Kenyon very closely, and the members of Congress argua-
bly perceived this section as a means of incorporating the Webb-
Kenyon approach into the Constitution. m Many assert, however,
that the legislative history of Section 2 does not reveal its precise
purpose. 130 Indeed, debate on the Twenty-first Amendment was
surprisingly sparse in Congress and in state ratifying conven-
tions. 131 Thus, the text of the Amendment itself serves as the best
available guide to interpret the meaning of Section 2. Even the text,
however, is susceptible to differing interpretations. 132 Recently, in
128. See id. at 180 n.130 (citing remarks of Sen. Wagner on Section 3 at 76 CONG. REc. 4145
(1933) ('If the Federal Government failed to discharge that responsibility under the all-
embracing prohibition of the eighteenth amendment, what folly is it which prompts anyone to
believe that it can discharge it under the milder language of the pending resolution.").
129. See 76 CONG REC. 4170 (1933) (statement of Sen. Borah); see also Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976) (stating that the franers of the Twenty-first Amendment had the "clear
intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework" established under the Wilson
and Webb-Kenyon Acts).
130. A commonly cited argument for the lack of clarity in the legislative history of the
Twenty-first Amendment is that its Senate sponsor, Senator Blaine, espoused two different
meanings of Section 2. Indeed, at one point Senator Blaine stated that the purpose of Section 2
was "to restore to the States... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting
intoxicating liquor." 76 CONG. REC. 4143 (1933). At another point he stated that the purpose of
the Amendment was simply "to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxi-
cating liquor." Id. at 4141; see also Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1984)
C'iV]e have recognized the obscurity of the legislative history of§ 2. No clear consensus concern-
ing the meaning of the provision is apparent." (citation omitted)); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107 n.10 (1980) (noting a "wise reluctance to wade
into the complex currents beneath the congressional proposal of the Amendment and its ratifica-
tion in the state conventions," then citing apparently conflicting statements made by the Senate
sponsor of the Amendment resolution); Douglass, supra note 14, at 1631 (evaluating the legisla-
tive history and concluding that the history of the Twenty-first Amendment ratification process
could yield one of three interpretations).
131. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 1631-32 (suggesting that debate may have been sparse
because most members of Congress were primarily interested only in repealing the Eighteenth
Amendment). See generally RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AhMND!EHNT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Everett Somerville Brown ed. 1938).
132. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 1629-30 (suggesting that the text can be read to give
states a complete exemption from strictures of the Commerce Clause when regulating liquor or
the text can be read narrowly as granting states only the power to regulate alcohol in ways that
do not violate the Commerce Clause). But see State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.,
299 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1936) (refusing to look beyond the text of the Twenty-first Amendment be-
cause "the language of the Amendment is clear" and "the Amendment has, in respect to liquor,
freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power to be found in other provisions of the
Constitution").
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Craig v. Boren, the Supreme Court stated that the text of Section 2
reveals at least one clear intention of the framers: "The wording of §
2 of the Twenty-first Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon
and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear intention of constitu-
tionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under
those statutes."133 Thus, properly interpreting the Wilson and
Webb-Kenyon Acts is absolutely essential to applying the Twenty-
first Amendment to any case.134
The Supreme Court's interpretation regarding the extent the
power of Section 2 upon the states has been quite complex and, of-
ten times, varied. Essentially, there are two broad questions that
the Court has addressed. First,13 5 the Court has assessed what im-
pact, if any, Section 2 has on Congress's affirmative commerce
clause power. 36 Furthermore, in the event that Congress does re-
tain the power to regulate alcohol, the Court has determined that
the Supremacy Clause still applies and requires that federal law
preempt the contradictory state regulation. 3 7 Second, 138 the Court
has assessed what impact Section 2 has upon the dormant com-
merce clause. 39 That is, the Court has analyzed whether the dor-
mant commerce clause was, in effect, repealed by the state alcohol
regulation, which leaves states to regulate alcohol in whatever way
they please.
Soon after the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment, in
cases challenging state liquor regulations as violations of the dor-
mant commerce clause, the Court repeatedly held that Section 2
entirely removed liquor from the ambit of the dormant commerce
clause. 140 Thus, out-of-state liquor industries did not receive the
133. 429 U.S. at 205-06.
134. See supra notes 80-113 and accompanying text (describing the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
Acts).
135. Hereinafter, this question will be referred to as the "affirmative commerce clause" ques-
tion.
136. Stated in another way, one might ask if Congress retained any power to regulate com-
merce in alcohol or if Section 2 completely turned alcohol regulation over to the states. Impor-
tantly, this question also involves the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which in very
general terms provides that federal law preempts state law when the two conflict. If Congress no
longer has power over alcohol regulation because of the Twenty-first Amendment, then the prin-
ciple of Supremacy Clause would not apply in the alcohol regulation context.
137. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
138. Hereinafter, this question will be referred to as the "dormant commerce clause" ques-
tion.
139. The dormant commerce clause question asks what power states have under Section 2 if
Congress has not exercised its affirmative commerce clause power.
140. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) ("The Twenty-first Amendment
sanctions the right of a State to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without,
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protections from discrimination that the dormant commerce clause
afforded to other products. In State Board of Equalization v.
Young's Market Co., the Court upheld a California statute that re-
quired those wishing to import beer from another state to pay a
$500 license fee for the privilege of doing so.141 Similarly, in Joseph
S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, the Court again held that the dormant
commerce clause did not apply to alcohol regulation. 42 In upholding
the state regulation in McKittrick, the Court assumed that the chal-
lenged Missouri alcohol statute was passed not for social welfare
purposes, but solely as an "economic weapon" against liquor from
other states. 43 These decisions clearly revealed the Court's position
that liquor had been entirely divested of its interstate character
with respect to the dormant commerce clause-even if it meant al-
lowing states to regulate alcohol in ways that merely protected in-
state alcohol industries.
The Court's early view of the Twenty-first Amendment's ef-
fect on Congress's affirmative commerce power was that the
Amendment did not remove Congress's power to regulate alcohol. In
William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, the Court rejected this very
argument in a single sentence, stating that "[w]e see no substance
in this contention."'144 Seven years after Morgenthau, in the dicta of
a case unrelated to alcohol, the, Court again noted that it did not
interpret the Twenty-first Amendment as relieving Congress of its
authority over interstate commerce in alcohol.145
It was not until Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp. that the Court first considered whether a state regulation of
alcohol that conflicted with a federal interstate commerce regula-
tion violated the Supremacy Clause. 146 Idlewild was a business in
New York City's Kennedy Airport that sold alcohol to travelers
unfettered by the Commerce Clause."); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 397
(1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938) (C[U]nder the Amendment,
discrimination against imported liquor is permissible although it is not an incident of reasonable
regulation of the liquor traffic.... . "); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S.
59, 62 (1936).
141. 299 U.S. at 60. In rejecting plaintiffs argument that if a state allows in-state liquor to
be sold, it "must let imported liquors compete with the domestic on equal terms," the Court
stated that such a view of the Twenty-first Amendment "would involve not a construction of the
Amendment, but a rewriting of it." Id. at 62, 64.
142. 305 U.S. at 398.
143. Id. at 397-98.
144. 307 U.S. 171, 173 (1939).
145. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 425 n.15 (1946) C Thus, even the commerce
in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first Amendment gives the States the highest
degree of control, is not altogether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power.").
146. 377 U.S. 324, 324 (1964).
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leaving the United States. 147 Customers who purchased alcohol
from Idlewild received only a receipt, and the United States Cus-
toms Office supervised placing the actual alcohol on the departing
plane. 148 Upon arrival in the foreign country, the consumer then
received the alcohol. 149 A New York law required that anyone sell-
ing alcohol within the state must obtain a license. 150 Idlewild did
not have a license and could not obtain one;151 thus, it brought a
Commerce Clause challenge to the New York licensing law.15 2
In the majority opinion, the Court began by recognizing that
it had held in its early cases 153 that the Twenty-first Amendment
gave states broad power to regulate the importation of liquor in
ways that would have otherwise violated the Commerce Clause. 54
After recounting the facts and holdings of the early cases, 155 the
Court noted that the principle espoused in those earlier cases "has
remained unquestioned."'156 The Court noted that those cases dealt
with the dormant commerce clause and in no way held that the
Twenty-first Amendment also served to "repeal" Congress's affirma-
tive commerce clause powers. 157
In finding the licensing law in Idlewild was unconstitutional,
the Court focused on two things. First, the Court recognized that
New York had the power under the Twenty-first Amendment to
regulate the importation of alcohol into the state; however, the li-
censing law as applied to Idlewild's business did not come within
this power. 158 Idlewild's customers did not receive the purchased
147. Id. at 325.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 326 n.2.
151. The New York law stated that no premises could be licensed to sell alcohol unless the
entrance opened onto a "public thoroughfare." Id. Since Idlewild was located within an airport, it
did not comply with theis restriction, and thus, could not obtain a license. Id. at 325.
152. Id. at 326-27.
153. See Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKit-
trick, 305 U.S. 395, 397 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938); State
Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
154. Idlewild, 377 U.S. at 330 C'This Court made clear in the early years following adoption
of the Twenty-first Amendment that by virtue of its provisions a State is totally unconfined by
traditional Commerce Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants des.
tined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders.").
155. Id. at 330-31.
156. Id. at 330.
157. Id. at 331-32. The Court stated that to conclude that the Twenty-first Amendment left
Congress "with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating liquor...
would be patently bizarre and is demonstrably incorrect." Id. at 332.
158. Id. at 332-33.
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alcohol until arriving in a foreign country. 5 9 Thus, the regulation,
as applied to Idlewild, did not prevent the importation of alcohol
into the state; rather, it regulated alcohol being imported into an-
other country-something that, according to the Court, the Twenty-
first Amendment did not empower New York to regulate. 160 Second,
the Court asserted that the creation of Customs Office rules and
oversight was an affirmative exercise of Congress's commerce
power, 161 and that New York's law violated the Supremacy Clause'6
because it conflicted with this affirmative exercise of federal
power. 16
3
III. BALANCING INTERESTS: CURRENT ANALYSIS OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Developing the Balancing Test: Midcal Aluminum and Capital
Cities Cable
In California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, the
Court retracted, or at least clarified, its strong inference in Idlewild
that a federal exercise of the commerce power necessarily preempts
a state's exercise of its Twenty-first Amendment power.'64 In Mid-
cal Aluminum, the Court held that California's alcohol price setting
regulation conflicted with the Sherman Antitrust Act.16 The Court
considered whether the Twenty-first Amendment permitted Cali-
fornia to enforce its alcohol regulation, despite its apparent conflict
with federal law. 66 In seeking to "harmonize the state and federal
powers," the Court held that the state had "complete control" over
how and whether it would allow liquor to be imported into its bor-
ders. 167 The Court noted, however, that state alcohol laws that were
not limited to regulating importation, like the one in Midcal Alu-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 333.
161. See id. at 334.
162. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL 2.
163. See Idlewild, 377 U.S. at 334.
164. See 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980) (discussing Idlewild, 377 U.S. at 334 (stating that New York
could not pass a law that prevented actions that were allowed by a federal law)).
165. 445 U.S. at 103. The Sherman Act was passed by Congress under its Commerce Clause
power and, very generally, bans restraints on free trade. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries,
Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 300 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 106 ("The remaining question before us is whether § 2 [of the Twenty-first
Amendment] permits California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted under the
commerce power-in favor of competition!).
167. Id. at 109-110.
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minum, 16 8 were subject to federal law in certain instances. 169 The
Court held that the federal interest in competition, secured by the
Sherman Act,170 outweighed the state interests in this case because
California's chosen method of regulation did not sufficiently accom-
plish the regulation's stated goals. 171 Thus, the Court created a sort
of balancing test.
The Court further expounded on this balance between fed-
eral and state interests in Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, a case in-
volving a state ban on alcohol advertising that conflicted with uni-
form Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regulations. 172
After finding that the federal and state laws were in conflict, the
Court stated that the determination of whether a state interest
outweighs an exercised federal interest hinges on "whether the in-
terests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the
powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regula-
tion may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly
conflict with express federal policies." 17 On the federal side of the
balance, the Court noted that there was substantial federAl interest
implicated in the FCC regulations. 174
The Court's assessment of the state side of the balance was
more complicated. In determining whether this state law should
outweigh the federal law, the Capital Cities Cable Court used two
separate assessment methods-one related to what the law did
(banning liquor advertisement), 175 and the other related to what the
168. The California law regulated prices and had little to do with how liquor would be im-
ported or distributed. Id. at 99.
169. Id. at 110 ('Although States retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regu-
lation [regulations not related to importation], those controls may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations.").
170. Id. ("Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise.").
171. Id. at 111-13. The regulation in question was a price maintenance system, and the ob-
jectives of this system were to promote temperance and protect smaller retailers. Id. at 112.
Finding that the particular regulation in question did not sufficiently serve state interests, id. at
112-13, the Court held that the affirmative commerce clause power outweighed the state regula-
tion, id. at 114 ('The unsubstantiated state concerns put forward in this case simply are not of
the same stature as the goals of the Sherman Act.").
172. 467 U.S. 691, 694 (1984). While the case did not involve a federal use of the Commerce
Clause, the Court likened it to Commerce Clause cases. Id. at 714 C'[T]he central question pre-
sented in [Idlewild and Midcal Aluminum] is essentially the same as the one before us here.").
173. Id.
174. Id. ('here can be little doubt that the comprehensive regulations developed over the
past 20 years by the FCC to govern signal carriage by cable television systems reflect an impor-
tant and substantial federal interest.").
175. Id. at 694.
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law sought to accomplish (discouraging consumption).17 6 The first
method involved a determination of how closely the state law re-
lated to the core power of the Twenty-first Amendment.1 7 The
Court noted that the central power of the Twenty-first Amendment
is the power to exercise control over how and whether alcohol will
be imported into the state.178 The Court maintained that the adver-
tising ban did not directly relate to the central power of controlling
imports; 179 thus, under this method of measurement, the state in-
terest was low.
The second method employed for measuring the state inter-
est closely resembled the approach taken in Midcal Aluminum;180
the Court examined the state law's effectiveness at accomplishing
its objective of discouraging consumption. 181 Because the ban on
advertising, in the Court's view, only modestly advanced the law's
stated objective of promoting temperance, the Court noted that the
state interest was low by this measurement as well. 182 Without stat-
ing whether both methods of assessment had to be satisfied rather
than just one, the Court held that the federal interest in having its
FCC regulations enforced outweighed the state interest in the ad-
vertising ban. 8 3
B. Shifting Analysis: Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias afforded the Court yet another
opportunity to develop its method of balancipg federal and state
176. Id. at 714-15.
177. Id. at 715. This method seems to comport with the Court's stated balance standard of
"whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers re-
served by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail... ." Id. at 714.
178. Id. at 715. The Court made this observation clear in two separate instances in the opin-
ion: "the central power reserved by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment (as] that of exercising
'control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system' "; and later, when the Court stated that"the State's central power under the
Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the times, places and manner under which liquor may be
imported and sold is not directly implicated." Id. at 715-16.
179. Id. at 715 ("Mhe application of Oklahoma's advertising ban to the importation of dis-
tant signals by cable television operators engages only indirectly the central power reserved by §
2 of the Twenty-first Amendment-that of exercising'control over whether to permit importation
or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.' ").
180. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 112-13
(1980).
181. See Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 714-15.
182. Id. at 715 C[We may nevertheless accept Oklahoma's judgment that restrictions on liq-
uor advertising represent at least a reasonable, albeit limited, means of furthering the goal of
promoting temperance in the State ... [Tihe selective approach Oklahoma has taken toward
liquor advertising suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it asserts here.").
183. Id. at 716.
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interests. 184 In Bacchus Imports, liquor wholesalers challenged the
constitutionality of a Hawaiian excise tax on alcohol. 185 The tax was
placed on both in-state and out-of-state alcohol, but tax exemptions
were granted to certain Hawaiian beverages. 186 The Hawaiian legis-
lature made it clear that its purpose in enacting the exemptions
was to protect its local alcohol industry. 187 The liquor wholesalers
argued that the exemptions violated the dormant commerce clause
because they facially discriminated against out-of-state industry. 188
In its defense, Hawaii argued that the Twenty-first Amendment
gave states the power to enact this discriminatory exemption. 189
Thus, the Court once again faced the dormant commerce clause
question. 90 The Court found that the discriminatory tax scheme
violated the federal interest in free trade in interstate commerce-
i.e., it violated the dormant commerce clause. 191 Having determined
this, the Court considered whether the Twenty-first Amendment
gave Hawaii the power to pass the statute despite the fact that it
violated the dormant commerce clause. 192
To determine if the statute was "saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment," the Court applied the Capital Cities Cable balancing
test.193 On the federal side of the balance, the Court stated that the
dormant commerce clause furthered important federal interests in
preventing "economic Balkanization."'194 On the state side of the bal-
ance, the Court focused on the fact that the state legislature had a
desire to protect and promote Hawaiian industry. 195 Because the
Court found that protectionism was not a "core purpose" of the
Twenty-first Amendment, it held that the state law demanded less
deference. 9 6 Thus, the balance shifted in favor of the federal inter-
est.197
184. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
185. Id. at 265.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 270-71.
188. Id. at 266.
189. Id. at 274.
190. The Court first heard this question in the Young's Market line of cases discussed at su-
pra notes 140-63 and accompanying text.
191. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 273.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 274-76.
194. Id. at 276.
195. Id. at 271.
196. Id. at 276 C'State laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are therefore not
entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted
traffic in liquor."). In fact, a strong argument could be made that the Court reasoned that if the
2520 [Vol. 54:2495
2001] THE WNE IS IN THE ML 2521
When viewed in light of previous Twenty-first Amendment
jurisprudence, it is clear that the Bacchus Imports Court substan-
tially shifted its analysis in two ways. First, prior to Bacchus Im-
ports, the Court had always held that the dormant commerce clause
did not constrain the state regulation of liquor.193 Indeed, the Court
even upheld statutes that were blatantly passed as "economic
weapons" against other states. 199 The line of cases including Mor-
ganthau, Idlewild, Midcal Aluminum, and Capital Cities Cable, re-
vealed that the Twenty-first Amendment did not wholly exclude
liquor from Commerce Clause operation. Those cases, however, all
dealt with situations in which the state regulation in question con-
flicted with an express exercise of congressional power under the
affirmative commerce clause.20 Justice Stevens argued vigorously
in his dissent that these prior holdings on Congress's affirmative
commerce power did not speak to the dormant commerce clause is-
sue in Bacchus Imports.20' Nonetheless, the majority implicitly
legislature was motivated by a desire to protect local industry, then the weight accorded to that
interest should be zero.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
199. Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1939).
200. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984) (stating that while there
was no exercise of the commerce power, there was a federal exercise of power in passing the FCC
regulations, and thus, that the state law conflicted with "express federal policies"); Cal. Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980) (holding that Congress
had passed the Sherman Act under its power to regulate interstate commerce); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 334 (1964) (noting that Congress had passed
the Tariff Act of 1930, which the Court concluded was an "exercise of [Congress's] explicit power
under the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations"); William Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939) (finding that Congress had passed the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act under its affirmative commerce power).
201. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 279 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) i'Given the dual character
of the [Commerce] Clause, it is not at all incongruous to assume that the power delegated to
Congress by the Commerce Clause is unimpaired while holding the inherent limitation imposed
by the Commerce Clause on the States is removed with respect to intoxicating liquors by the
Twenty-first Amendment."). Other Justices have also argued in dissents that the TWenty-first
Amendment should be read either to remove any power completely from Congress to regulate
alcohol or at the very least to allow states to exercise authority without Commerce Clause re-
straint in the absence of an affirmative exercise of federal power. See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc.,
491 U.S. 324, 349 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Neglecting to consider [the] increased
authority [over liquor given by the Twenty-first Amendment] is especially disturbing here where
the perceived proscriptive force of the Commerce Clause does not flow from an affirmative legis-
lative decision and so is at its nadir."); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 356 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The history of the Amendment strongly supports [the] view that the
Twenty-first Amendment was intended to return absolute control of the liquor trade to the
States, and that the Federal Government could not use its Commerce Clause powers to interfere
in any manner with the States' exercise of the power conferred by the Amendment.L"); Idlewild,
377 U.S. at 338 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen the Senators agreed to Section 2 they thought
VANDERBILTLAWREVIEW
overruled the earlier dormant commerce clause cases, 20 2 and held
that the Twenty-first Amendment did not wholly exclude state al-
cohol regulation from the application of the dormant commerce
clause.
Second, the Bacchus Imports decision, though decided only
eleven days after Capital Cities Cable, shifted the focus of the Capi-
tal Cities Cable balancing test from one of constitutional power to
one of "central purposes." 203 As noted above, the Capital Cities Ca-
ble Court analyzed two methods for assessing what weight should
be attributed to the state interest.20 4 The Bacchus Imports decision
added yet another method for evaluating the weight of the state
interest: If the legislature, in passing the bill, was motivated by a
desire to promote local industry by discriminating against out-of-
state competitors, then the state interest should be given little or
no weight. 205
On its face, the new method used in Bacchus Imports may
not appear particularly extraordinary; indeed, some might argue
that it is really no different from the first method used in the Capi-
tal Cities Cable case-it simply seeks to determine how closely the
purpose of the law relates to the purpose of the Twenty-first
Amendment. The fundamental difference, though, lies in the fact
that in Capital Cities Cable the Court focused on powers while the
Bacchus Imports method focuses on purposes or legislative motiva-
tion. In the Capital Cities Cable method, the Court compared
whether the power that the state exercised, banning liquor adver-
tising, matched the core power granted by the Twenty-first
Amendment, that of "exercising control over whether to permit im-
portation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribu-
tion system."20 6 In Bacchus Imports, however, the Court introduced
the purpose concept by analyzing whether the motivation of the
state legislators matched the motivation of the framers of the
they were returning 'absolute control' of liquor traffic to the States, free of all restrictions which
the Commerce Clause might before that time have imposed.").
202. As noted, these early cases stated rather boldly that the dormant commerce clause sim-
ply did not apply to state regulations of alcohol. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
203. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 286-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. The two methods were: (1) if the particular state law did not substantially advanco the
state interest, then the weight accorded to the state side of the balance would be less; and (2) if
the particular method of regulation did not closely relate to the core power of regulating im-
ported liquor, then the state side of the balance would be accorded less weight. See supra notes
175-83 and accompanying text.
205. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276.
206. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984).
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Twenty-first Amendment.207 In other words, the purpose concept
shifted the Court's focus from what the legislature actually did to
what motivated the legislature to do what it did.2 3 Justice Stevens,
dissenting in Bacchus Imports, expressed considerable disagree-
ment with the majority's entire consideration of "purposes," ques-
tioning the wisdom of basing the constitutionality of a statute upon
"a judicial evaluation of the motivation of legislators."20 9
C. An Overview of the Supreme Court's Framework of Analysis
The Court's decisions in Midcal Aluminum, Capital Cities
Cable, and Bacchus Imports do not provide a great deal of clarity on
how the Court will analyze state alcohol regulations that conflict
with federal interests. Nonetheless, the following framework at-
tempts to summarize and capture the various elements of the
Court's analyses in Twenty-first Amendment cases. While the Court
never explicitly sets out the following framework, it accurately cap-
tures the Court's analysis of Twenty-first Amendment cases.
Therefore, it is a useful tool for analyzing what considerations drive
the Court's analysis and perhaps whether those considerations are
sound.
When a state alcohol regulation statute is challenged as an
unconstitutional violation of the Commerce Clause, the Court ap-
plies a two-part test. First, the Court considers if the state statute
conflicts with a federal interest.210 A state statute is considered to
be in conflict if it interferes with an affirmative exercise of the
commerce power 21' or, after Bacchus Imports, if it runs afoul of the
dormant commerce clause.212 If there is no conflict, then the statute
207. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275-76. See infra Part VA-B for a critique of the introduc-
tion of the purpose concept.
208. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 271 C[%W]e need not guess at the legislature's motiva-
tion.").
209. Id. at 287 n.15. Justice Stevens went on to liken this approach of assessing the motiva-
tion of legislators to the "repudiated era in which this Court struck down assertions of Congress's
power to regulate commerce on the ground that the objective of Congress was not to regulate
commerce, but rather to remedy some local problem." Id. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (offering an example of the "repudiated era" to which Justice Stevens re-
ferred); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (same); Railroad Retire-
ment Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (same). For a further analysis of Justice Stevens's
critique of the purposes approach, see infra notes 405-09 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275-76; Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 694;
Cal Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980).
211. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
212. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 268.
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is constitutional. 213 If there is a conflict, however, the Court will
move to part two and consider whether the Twenty-first Amend-
ment "saves" the statute despite the conflict.
214
The Court's analysis for the second part can be confusing.
Though the Court claims simply to balance the state interest
against the federal interest, 215 how it truly assesses these interests
is unclear. In every case in which the Court has used the balancing
test, it has concluded that the federal interest should be given great
weight. 2 6 Therefore, since the federal interest is constant, the out-
come of the balancing test always hinges on the weight accorded to
the state interest.
As noted, the Court has developed three separate methods
for assessing the weight of the state interest. The cases do not make
clear which method will be used in which case, and the Court has
never applied all three methods in any single case. In general,
though, it appears that if any of the three balancing methods show
that the state interest is low, then the state statute will be struck
down. 21 7 Thus, rather than thinking about these three methods as a
means of weighing a state's interest, these methods can be more
effectively thought of as three elements that need to be satisfied in
order for the Twenty-first Amendment to save a state statute.
218
The three methods can be restated as three elements in the
following way. The first element (the powers element) relates to the
213. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42-43 (1966) (finding no
conflict and upholding the state regulation).
214. See id. at 42-47 (considering whether the state regulations were saved by the Twenty-
first Amendment despite their conflict with federal policy).
215. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
216. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 276 C'It is beyond doubt that the Commerce Clause it-
self furthers strong federal interests in preventing economic Balkanization."); Capital Cities
Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984) ('here can be little doubt that the comprehensive
regulations developed over the past 20 years by the FCC to govern signal carriage by cable tele-
vision systems reflect an important and substantial federal interest."). In a later case, Chief
Justice Rehnquist made an oblique argument in his dissent that the federal interest should be
given less weight when only the dormant commerce clause interests are implicated, stating that
this is when the federal interest in its commerce power is at its "nadir." Healy v. Beer Inst, Inc.,
491 U.S. 324, 349 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
217. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275-76 (using only legislative motivation-legitimate
ends method); Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 714-15 (using only powers method and means-
ends method to strike down statute); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1980) (using only meas-ends method to strike down statute); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 V.S. 324, 334 (1964) (using only powers method to strike
down statute).
218. Note, however, that the means-ends method is not consistently used in all cases; thus, it
is unclear if this element must be satisfied. See infra note 263.
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power the Twenty-first Amendment confers on the states. 219 Under
this element, the Court should examine if the Twenty-first Amend-
ment gives the state the power to enact the particular law in ques-
tion.220 If the law is not passed pursuant to the state's power under
the Twenty-first Amendment, then the Twenty-first Amendment
should not save it. This element develops out of cases like Idlewild,
in which the Court held that states do not have the power to regu-
late alcohol distribution outside of their own borders.21 This ele-
ment is also seen in the first method used by the Court in Capital
Cities Cable.222 The Court's clearest statement of what power it per-
ceives that the Twenty-first Amendment gives to states is in Capi-
tal Cities Cable, where the Court held that the core power was to
"control... whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution."
22
The second element (the Bacchus Imports element) involves
whether, in passing the alcohol regulation, the state legislature was
motivated by a legitimate concern. This element develops from the
Bacchus Imports case, in which the Court held that the motivation
behind a state alcohol regulation cannot be economic protection-
ism.2 24 Thus, even though the power exercised by Hawaii was
within its Twenty-first Amendment power (the power to regulate
alcohol importation and sale within state borders), that power was
used in an impermissible way (to promote in-state industry at the
expense of out-of-state industry).
22 5
Finally, the Court may consider a third element (the
means/ends element): whether the means chosen are likely to ac-
complish the end sought.226 This element arises out of cases like
Midcal Aluminum, where the Court held that the price mainte-
nance scheme did not sufficiently advance the state's proclaimed
goals of promoting temperance and protecting small retailers,2
219. See supra notes 177-79.
220. See supra notes 177-79.
221. See Idlewild, 377 U.S. at 333.
222. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 715.
223. Id. Later in the same opinion the Court rephrased the core power as the power to "[regu-
late] the times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold." Id. at 716.
224. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
225. Id.
226. It is unclear whether the Court always considers this element or whether it is usually
easily satisfied, and thus so rarely analyzed. Nonetheless, there are some cases where the third
element is dispositive. See, e.g., 324 Liquor v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 350 (1987). There are sone
cases where the element is not a part of the Court's analysis at all. See, e.g., North Dakota v.
United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
227. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1980)
(accepting the California Supreme Court's determination that there was "little correlation be-
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and Capital Cities Cable, where the Court held that the state ad-
vertising ban only moderately advanced its temperance goals.
228 It
is worth mentioning that the Court did not state, in any of these
cases, how closely the means had to be tied to the ends to survive
the Court's review.2 2
9
Recent cases have displayed the Court's use of the principles
developed in this framework. In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority, the plaintiffs challenged a New
York price affirmation statute.230 The law required all distillers and
suppliers of alcohol to affirm that they did not sell liquor to New
York wholesalers for a higher price than they charged out-of-state
wholesalers. 231 In Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., the Court decided a
similar issue, the lone difference being that the Connecticut price
affirmation statute at issue in Healy only required out-of-state dis-
tillers to affirm their prices.23 2 In both cases, the Court noted that
these types of statutes effectively regulated the price of liquor in
other states. 233 In determining whether or not these statutes were
constitutional, the Court did not have to go further than the first
element (the powers element) of the framework. In each case, the
Court held that the Twenty-first Amendment grants states the
power to control the sale and distribution of alcohol within its bor-
ders, but it does not grant states the authority to regulate liquor
sales in other states. 23 4 Therefore, the Court held that the Twenty-
tween resale price maintenance and temperance," and the statement later in the opinion that
"[n]othing in the record in this case suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments").
228. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. 714-15.
229. Therefore, it is unclear if a statute will be struck down if the Court can imagine a more
effective means (a strict scrutiny standard) or if the statute will be upheld if the Court can con-
ceive of a way that the statute might accomplish its objective (a rational basis review). In one of
its more recent cases, however, the Court made a statement that sounds closer to rational basis
than strict scrutiny. See North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 433 (stating there is a strong presumption of
validity for state liquor control policies). Some commentators have suggested that the Court's
standard of review is strict scrutiny, requiring that there be no less burdensome way of accom-
plishing its goals. See Shanker, supra note 9, at 381. The support offered for this strict scrutiny
of means-ends relationship, however, comes from a case involving the First Amendment, not the
dormant commerce clause. Id. at 381 n.191.
230. 476 U.S. 573, 575 (1986).
231. Id. at 576.
232. 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989).
233. Healy, 491 U.S. at 337; Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579. The reasoning as to
why the statutes have this effect can be summarized as follows: if a distributor of alcohol wants
to sell alcohol in New York he will have to keep the prices up in other states to ensure that he is
not charging more to New York wholesalers than he is to wholesalers in other states. Brown.
Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579.
234. Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 585 ('[The Twenty-first] Amendment ... gives
New York only the authority to control sales of liquor in New York, and confers no authority to
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first Amendment did not save these statutes because neither state
had the power the statutes asserted.2 5
In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, the Court used the third ele-
ment (the means/ends element) of the framework to find a state re-
tail price fixing scheme unconstitutional.2 6 After holding that the
statute in question violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court
considered whether the Twenty-first Amendment saved this stat-
ute.2 3 7 With respect to element one, the Court did little analysis,
stating only that the Twenty-first Amendment granted states the
"power to regulate, or prohibit entirely, the transportation or im-
portation of intoxicating liquor within their borders."m Unlike in
Brown-Forman Distillers and Healy, the statute in this case only
regulated in-state liquor prices; 23 9 so presumably, the Court consid-
ered a regulation of in-state liquor prices to be within a state's
power. The Court provided little analysis of legislative motivation,
stating merely that the purpose of the pricing scheme was to pro-
tect small retailers.24 Instead, the Court focused upon the
means/ends element, holding that there was no evidence provided
that tended to show that the pricing scheme had the effect of pro-
tecting small retailers. 241
D. Applying the Bacchus Imports Element
The above cases dealt with the first (the power element) and
third (the means/ends element) elements of the framework; how-
ever, the second element (the Bacchus Imports element) is more
often the center of analysis. To review, the second element arises
out of the Bacchus Imports case-the central question there being
whether the state legislature was motivated by protectionist con-
cerns.242 In Bacchus Imports, the Court held that Hawaii's purpose
control sales in other States."); Healy, 491 U.S. at 342 (relying explicitly on the Brown.Forman
Distillers rationale).
235. Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 585.
236. 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
237. Id. at 346.
238. Id.
239. There was no regulation of out-of-state prices because the price floor was not tied to the
prices charged in other states as it was in Brown.Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579, and Healy,
491 U.S. at 337.
240. 324 Liquor, 479 U.S. at 349. It is unclear whether the Court perceived that this goal was
legitimate, but it did not hang its constitutional hat on this hook.
241. Id. at 350 ("We are unwilling to assume on the basis of this record that [the statute] has
the effect of protecting small retailers.").
242. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
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of protecting local industry was not a legitimate goal of Twenty-first
Amendment regulation.243 Importantly though, the Bacchus Imports
Court did not clearly address the question of what permissible goals
states could seek to achieve through the use of their Twenty-first
Amendment power. 24 That question was left open for future cases.
1. Supreme Court Analysis: North Dakota v. United States
The Court returned to the legitimate goals question in North
Dakota v. United States.245 The case was actually a Supremacy
Clause challenge, but the issues were identical to the Commerce
Clause cases previously discussed. North Dakota, like many other
states, 24 had a comprehensive system for importing and distribut-
ing liquor, 247 similar to the three-tier system already described.
248
Each tier was permitted to sell only to the tier beneath it, and the
state collected taxes at all levels. 249 The distribution scheme had
the effect of preventing North Dakota retailers and consumers from
buying alcohol directly from out-of-state distributors by requiring
the out-of-state sellers to sell only to wholesalers. 2 0 By way of a
federal statute passed in 1986,251 Congress permitted military bases
in every state to purchase alcohol from the cheapest source. 252 This
gave the federal government an option that in-state retailers and
consumers did not have-the option to purchase alcohol directly
from out-of-state suppliers, circumventing the in-state wholesal-
ers.253 North Dakota, fearing that the alcohol purchased by the fed-
eral government for use on its military bases would be diverted into
the state market, passed a law requiring that out-of-state suppliers
who sell alcohol to the federal government for use on military bases
affix a label on all bottles stating that the liquor was for consump-
243. Id. C'The central purpose of the [Twenty-first Amendment] was not to empower States
to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition.").
244. In the only reference the Court made to this question, it stated that Hawaiis statute did
not seek "to promote temperance or to carry out any other purpose of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment." Id. Obviously, "any other purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment' is a uselessly broad
statement of what the legitimate goals of a tate's Twenty-first Amendment regulations might bo.
245. 495 U.S. 423 (1990).
246. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (describing three-tier system).
247. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 428.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 439.
251. Act of Dec. 19, 1985, tit. VIII, § 8099, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 1219 (1986).
252. North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 427.
253. Id.
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tion only on the military base.254 Out-of-state distributors informed
the federal government that they would not ship to military bases
in North Dakota because of the labeling requirements.2 5 The
United States thereupon brought suit against North Dakota claim-
ing that the labeling requirements discriminated against the fed-
eral government in violation of the Supremacy Clause.2 6
The Court viewed North Dakota's establishment of labeling
requirements as an effort to protect its three-tier system of alcohol
distribution.25 7 The threat posed to the state's system was that the
alcohol purchased by the federal government and imported onto the
military bases within the state might be diverted into the state re-
tail market, thereby disrupting the state's distribution system.28
Thus, one of the issues before the Court was whether North Dakota
had a right to protect its three-tier distribution system. In other
words, the Court considered whether the creation of a three-tier
system for alcohol distribution was a valid exercise of a state's
Twenty-first Amendment power.
The Court used the framework developed above to answer
this question. In assessing the state's regulation, the Court stated
that "[i]n the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly
market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a
comprehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its bor-
ders."25 9 This statement essentially contains the necessary compo-
nents for assessing both the first and second elements of the frame-
work. Element one addressed whether the state law is within its
Twenty-first Amendment power, and the statement makes it clear
that the law here establishes a "comprehensive system for the
distribution of liquor."260 Element two involves whether the system
has a legitimate goal and the statement reveals that the goals of
the system are "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
conditions, and raising revenue."261 In one sentence, the Court an-
swered the questions posed by both elements in favor of the state:
"That system is unquestionably legitimate."262 In other words, the
254. Id. at 428.
255. Id. at 429. Actually, only five of the six suppliers refused to deliver to bases inside North
Dakota. The sixth supplier merely substantially increased its prices to cover the labeling costs.
Id.
256. Id. at 438-39.
257. Id. at 438.
258. Id. at 433.
259. Id.
260. Id.




state's action was within its Twenty-first Amendment power (ele-
ment one) and the goals sought by the state's exercise of its Twenty-
first Amendment power were legitimate (element two). 263 This ele-
ment two analysis significantly clarifies the question left unan-
swered by Bacchus Imports because it addresses which legitimate
goals a state may seek to accomplish under the Twenty-first
Amendment. In North Dakota, the Court listed three such legiti-
mate goals as "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
conditions, and raising revenue."264
2. Lower Court Analysis
Lower courts have differing interpretations of what goals
states may legitimately pursue in exercising their Twenty-first
Amendment power. Perhaps the narrowest statement defining a
state's legitimate goals came from a New York district court case
decided prior to the Supreme Court's North Dakota decision. In Lo-
retto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, the plaintiffs challenged a New York
statute that permitted wine coolers to be sold in New York liquor
stores only if the wine was produced using New York grapes.265 The
court believed that the statute facially violated the dormant com-
merce clause; 266 thus, the constitutionality of the statute hinged
upon whether or not it was saved by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. 267 The court held that the only purpose for which New York
could legitimately use its Twenty-first Amendment power was to
promote temperance. 268 Finding that the New York statute did not
263. Close readers may ask what happened to element three of the framework. The Court
has never analyzed whether the means used (a comprehensive distribution system) furthered the
state's goals of "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising rovo
nue." Probably the most likely explanation for the absence of the element three analysis is that
the Court simply presumed that the element was satisfied. This is not a surprising presumption,
especially given the Courts statement that "[gliven the special protection afforded to state liquor
control policies by the Twenty-first Amendment, they are supported by a strong presumption of
validity and should no't be set aside lightly." Id. at 433. The strong presumption of validity im-
plies that the means would probably only need to be rationally related to the ends, a standard
that is almost universally satisfied.
264. Id. at 432.
265. 601 F. Supp. 850, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
266. Id. at 857.
267. Id. at 859.
268. Id. at 861 C'[T]he powers reserved [by the Twenty-first Amendment] must be exercised
with temperance as their goal").
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promote temperance in purpose or effect, the court held that the
Twenty-first Amendment did not save the state regulation. 269
In Quality Brands, Inc. v. Barry, another pre-North Dakota
decision, the District Court for the District of Columbia came to a
similar conclusion as the Loretto Winery court.20 The case involved
a D.C. regulation that required D.C. liquor wholesalers to hold their
liquor at in-state storage facilities. 271 Relying on the Loretto Winery
court's reasoning, the court concluded that the regulation could not
survive unless it "directly promote[d] temperance."2 2 The court spe-
cifically rejected "taxation, inspection, and the maintenance of local
jobs," in and of themselves, as legitimate goals of Twenty-first
Amendment regulation because they did not directly promote tem-
perance goals.2 73 Finding that the statute did not have any "real
impact on temperance," the court found the regulation to be inva-
lid.274
Since the North Dakota decision, two federal appellate courts
have directly addressed the Bacchus Imports element;2" neither
circuit adopted the narrow interpretation of the legitimate goals
issue espoused in Loretto Winery and Quality Brands.26 In Milton
S. Kronheim & Co. u. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit seri-
ously undercut the holding of Quality Brands regarding the legiti-
mate ends issue.2 77 The District of Columbia, which the court held
should be treated as a state for dormant commerce clause and
Twenty-first Amendment purposes, 278 sought to enforce a law that
was almost identical to the one the district court held unconstitu-
tional in Quality Brands.279 The law forbade liquor licensees in the
District to store their beverage inventory at warehouses outside the
District. 280 After determining that Quality Brands did not have pre-
clusive effect,28 ' the court concluded that the statute violated the
269. Id. at 862-63.
270. Quality Brands, Inc. v. Barry, 715 F. Supp. 1138, 1138 (D.D.C. 1989).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 1142-43.
273. Id. at 1143.
274. Id.
275. See Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994).
276. See supra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
277. Milton S. Kronheim, 91 F.3d at 193.
278. Id. at 198-99.
279. Quality Brands, 715 F. Supp. at 1138. The district court decision was affirmed in an un-
published opinion by the D.C. Circuit in Quality Brands, Inc. v. Barry, 901 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (per curiam).
280. Milton S. Kronheirn & Co., 91 F.3d at 195.
281. Id. at 197-98.
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dormant commerce clause because the law was "patently discrimi-
natory. ' 282 The court then considered whether the Twenty-first
Amendment saved the District of Columbia alcohol ordinance. Un-
der element one (the power element), the court noted that the law
requiring warehouses to be within the District was within its
Twenty-first Amendment power, which was the "plenary power to
regulate and control ... the distribution ... of intoxicants within
her territory."28
3
Primarily though, the court in Milton S. Kronheim & Co. fo-
cused its inquiry on the second element (the Bacchus Imports ele-
ment). The court noted that the Bacchus Imports decision made
clear that protection of in-state industry was not a legitimate moti-
vation for legislation under the Twenty-first Amendment. 28 4 Distin-
guishing the case before it from Bacchus Imports, the court noted
that in Bacchus Imports, the Hawaiian legislature was motivated
solely by protectionist concerns, whereas here, the District of Co-
lumbia Council had passed the law with "mixed motives." 285 While
its motives may have been partly protectionist, the D.C. Council
also had legitimate Twenty-first Amendment goals in mind.286 The
court in this case parted from the Loretto Wines and Quality Brands
decisions by not limiting legitimate purposes and motivations to the
promotion of temperance. The court held that the District's motiva-
tion in passing the warehouse restriction law was to facilitate
"auditing company records, monitoring compliance with the ABC
laws, monitoring licenses, checking tax forms for audits" 287-in
short, the state designed the law to ensure orderly market
conditions. Promoting these conditions, the court held, "falls
squarely within the state's core enforcement powers over alcohol."288
The Fifth Circuit has also considered the second element
(the Bacchus Imports element). In Cooper v. McBeath, two Florida
citizens challenged a Texas law that imposed a residency require-
ment for obtaining a permit to sell mixed drinks in Texas. 28 9 First,
282. Id. at 201. The court stated that the law was discriminatory because it "not only do.
prives out-of-state businesses access to a local market, but also requires that business operations
be performed in the District even if they could be performed more efficiently elsewhere." Id.
(citations omitted).




287. Id. (quoting a statement made by a District councilman that was paraphrased in Qual.
ity Brands, Inc. v. Barry, 715 F. Supp. 1138, 1141 (D.D.C 1989)).
288. Id. at 204.
289. 11 F.3d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1994).
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the court determined that the statute had the effect of discriminat-
ing against out-of-state industry in favor of in-state industry.2 SO
Considering whether the Twenty-first Amendment saved the stat-
ute, the court found Bacchus Imports dispositive. Unlike Bacchus
Imports, where the Supreme Court had looked to legislative motiva-
tion to determine what the goal of the legislature had been, the
Fifth Circuit looked to the legislative effect to determine what goal
the legislature sought.291 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit arrived at
the same conclusion as the Bacchus Imports Court-the Texas law
sought to protect in-state interests.2 9 2 As the Bacchus Imports Court
made clear, protectionism was not a legitimate goal that states
could seek to accomplish through the exercise of their Twenty-first
Amendment powers; thus, the Texas residency requirement was
held to be unconstitutional. 29 Citing North Dakota for the proposi-
tion that labeling and reporting requirements were legitimate uses
of Twenty-first Amendment power, the Cooper court cursorily indi-
cated what might be legitimate goals under the Twenty-first
Amendment. 294
IV. THE DIRECT SHIPMENT ISSUE
A. Law Against Direct Shipment
In light of the foregoing discussion of the Twenty-first
Amendment, the legal issues involved in the direct shipment debate
are relatively clear. Under the Supreme Court's analysis, courts
must first determine whether the state law against direct shipment
of alcohol conflicts with a federal interest, namely the dormant com-
merce clause.295 If the laws do violate the dormant commerce
clause, then courts should consider whether the Twenty-first
Amendment saves the direct shipment law. As noted above, there
are three basic ways the Supreme Court has found that the Twenty-
first Amendment did not save state alcohol regulation: (1) if the
regulation is simply not within the state's power to control importa-
tion, distribution, or sale of alcohol within its borders; (2) if the
290. Id. at 553. The court noted that the legislature was not motivated by protectionism, but
that "protectionism (while absent in motivation) can manifest itself in effect." Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 555.
293. Id. at 555-56.
294. Id. at 555. This statement appears to be an implicit recognition that there are legitimate
goals other than the promotion of temperance.
295. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 705 (1984).
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regulation was passed with a purpose or seeks to achieve a goal
that the Court views as illegitimate, such as economic protection-
ism; or (3) if the Court perceives that the state has chosen an inef-
fectual means to accomplish its ends. 296 The arguments in cases
brought thus far have focused on the Bacchus Imports element of
the framework.
B. Lower Court Analysis of Direct Shipment Laws
Though many cases have been filed, 297 only three federal dis-
trict courts and one federal appellate court have decided cases chal-
lenging the constitutionality of direct shipment laws. One of the
district court cases 298 is over thirty years old, thus, its applicability
is somewhat questionable. In that case, the district court upheld
New York's law prohibiting alcoholic beverages from being shipped
into the state to non-licensed persons. 299 The House of York, Ltd. v.
Ring court held that states have very broad power to regulate alco-
hol that is being imported into the state for consumption therein.
3 00
The court's perception of state authority in regulating imports was
so broad that it quoted with approval that states have " 'the power
to prohibit or to condition in the most discriminatory fashion the
importation into its territory of all intoxicants.' ",301 The Twenty-
first Amendment landscape, however, has changed significantly
since the House of York decision, and district courts deciding the
direct shipment issue in recent years have not followed the House of
York lead.
296. See supra notes 255-66 and accompanying text (explaining how these three elements are
derived from Twenty-first Amendment cases).
297. See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding Indi-
ana's direct shipment law constitutional, reversing the district court), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
1672 (2001); Bolick v. Roberts, No. 99CV755, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11118, at *108-09 (E.D, Va.
July 27, 2001) (holding Florida's statutory scheme regarding distilled spirits constitutional, but
the scheme for wine and beer in violation of the Commerce Clause); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F.
Supp. 2d 1306, 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (holding Florida's direct shipment law constitutional);
Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 710 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (declaring Texas's direct shipment
law unconstitutional); Sweedenburg v. Kelly, No. 00 CV 778 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.) (pending);
Beskind v. Easley, No. 3:00-CV-258-MU (W.D.N.C.) (pending); Heald v. Engler, No. 00-CV-
71438-DT (E.D. Mich.) (pending). For copies of the pleadings for these pending cases, see Wine
and Spirits of America, Inc., supra note 3.
298. See House of York, Ltd. v. Ring, 322 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
299. Id. at 533.
300. Id. at 534. The court distinguished between cases where the state was attempting regu-
late alcohol that was merely being transported through a state, and this case where alcohol that
was being transported into a state for consumption therein, holding that state authority in the
latter case was afforded full protection by the Twenty-first Amendment. Id.
301. Id. (quoting Epstein v. Lordi, 261 F. Supp. 921, 932 (D.N.J. 1966)).
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In Dickerson v. Bailey, Texas resident wine consumers chal-
lenged a Texas law that prohibited them from importing more than
three gallons of wine from out of state without a license.3°2 The law
also contained a complimentary provision that forbade out of state
suppliers from shipping wine into the state.30 3 Plaintiffs claimed
that the direct shipment law violated the dormant commerce clause
because it discriminated against out-of-state suppliers of alcohol.10
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the statute was facially
discriminatory. The court then considered whether the Twenty-first
Amendment saved the statute from unconstitutionality. 3 5 Relying
heavily on the Loretto Winery decision, the court held that the only
legitimate goal a state could seek to accomplish through the exer-
cise of its Twenty-first Amendment power was the promotion of
temperance.3 06 The court held that there was "no temperance goal
served by the statute"; thus, it failed the legitimate purpose ele-
ment and was unconstitutional. 307 The Dickerson court has not yet
entered final judgment in the case, however, so it is unclear at this
point whether the court will make its ultimate decision against the
direct shipment law.308
The only direct shipment case to reach the federal appellate
court level is a case involving a direct shipment law in Indiana. 30 9
In 1998, Indiana passed a law that prohibited anyone in the busi-
ness of selling alcoholic beverages in another state from shipping
such beverages directly to Indiana residents who did not possess a
wholesaler's permit. 310 The plaintiffs, Indiana wine collectors, chal-
lenged the law as a violation of the dormant commerce clause.311
302. 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693-94 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
303. Id. at 694.
304. Id. at 695-96.
305. Id. at 710.
306. Id. at 707-08.
307. Id. at 710.
308. On March 26, 2001, the court denied plaintiffs motion for the entry of final judgment
and granted defendant's motion to reconsider the decision in light of the Seventh Circuit decision
in Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000). Both the plaintiff and defen-
dant were given time to submit briefs, and the court has not yet issued decision. For a copy of the
court order denying plaintiffs motion and granting defendant's motion to reconsider, see Wine
and Spirits Wholesalers of America, Inc., supra note 3.
309. See Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999), reu'd sub nom. Bri-
denbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672 (2001).
310. IND. CODE § 7.1-5-11-1.5(a) (2000). The full text of the provision states, "It is unlawful
for a person in the business of selling alcoholic beverages in another state or country to ship or
cause to be shipped an alcoholic beverage directly to an Indiana resident who does not hold a
valid wholesaler permit under this title. This includes the ordering and selling of alcoholic bev-
erages over a computer network." Id.
311. Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 830-31.
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The State defended its statute on grounds that it did not discrimi-
nate against out-of-state commerce, and that even if the statute did
discriminate, the Twenty-first Amendment granted Indiana the
power to pass such a statute.31
2
The district court held that the Indiana statute violated the
dormant commerce clause and did not come within a core purpose of
the Twenty-first Amendment; in other words, the statute did not
serve a legitimate end.8 18 The court found that the statute discrimi-
nated between "in state ... and out of state purveyors of alcoholic
beverages. '314 The State argued that there was no discrimination
because the law simply required all purveyors of alcohol, whether
in-state or out-of-state, to have a permit to distribute alcohol; thus,
both parties were treated equally.315 Rejecting the argument, the
court found the statute to be discriminatory because permits were
not given to out-of-state residents.316 Finding that the statute vio-
lated the dormant commerce clause, the court moved to the consid-
eration of whether the Twenty-first Amendment saved the direct
shipment law.
The district court focused on whether or not Indiana had ex-
ercised its Twenty-first Amendment power to accomplish a legiti-
mate end. 31 7 Following Lorretto Winery and later Dickerson, the
Indiana district court found that the only legitimate goal that a
state could pursue via its Twenty-first Amendment power was to
promote temperance.318 The court conducted its analysis of whether
the Twenty-first Amendment saved the statute in one sentence of a
concluding footnote: "Temperance is not the issue in the case now
before this Court. '319
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court in
an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook.3 20 Judge Easterbrook em-
312. See id. at 831-32.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 832.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 832 n.4 (holding that temperance was not served by the statute and implicitly
considering whether the statute had sought to accomplish this end).
318. Id. at 831. The court provided little reasoning as to why temperance is the only legiti-
mate goal stating only that "[r]ecent lower court cases have demonstrated that temperance is the
core purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment." Id. (citing Quality Brands, Loretto Winery, and
Cooper).
319. Id. at 832 n.4.
320. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 854 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1672 (2001). Ironically, Judge Easterbrook, prior to his appointment to the bench, argued the
Bacchus Imports case before the Supreme Court for the plaintiffs, arguing that the Hawaiian
statute violated the dormant commerce clause and was not saved by the Twenty-first Amend-
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ployed a somewhat novel approach to the issues in the case. He be-
gan his analysis by rejecting the notion that an inquiry into the
"core purposes" of the Twenty-first Amendment was required.321
This move effectively eliminated the legitimate purposes analysis
under element two that Bacchus Imports had developed. Having
removed the legitimate purposes element from the inquiry, there
was no longer a need to determine whether a state's legitimate uses
of its Twenty-first Amendment power were limited to the promotion
of temperance or if the Amendment permitted states to pursue
broader objectives such as raising revenue and ensuring orderly
market conditions.322 Nor was there any need to inquire into the
motivations of the Indiana legislature.
Judge Easterbrook's analysis focused on what power the
Twenty-first Amendment conferred upon the states, and answered
this issue in accordance with the "text and history" of the Amend-
ment.32 Judge Easterbrook noted that the Supreme Court had held
in Bowman and Leisy that states could place restrictions on sales of
in-state alcohol, but that states could not restrict or condition the
sale of alcohol coming from out-of-state-to do so would violate the
dormant commerce clause.324 This resulted, as Judge Easterbrook
interpreted it, in a sort of "reverse discrimination" against in-state
industry.3 25 A primary purpose, then, of the Wilson Act was to
eliminate this reverse discrimination.3 26 Importantly though, as
Judge Easterbrook noted, the Wilson Act did not permit states to
favor in-state products, but simply permitted them to treat in- and
out-of-state alcohol equally.32- Webb-Kenyon, according to Judge
Easterbrook, extended the principle of allowing states to treat all
alcohol equally to mail-order shipments, thus, closing the loophole
mert. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 264 (1984). This fact makes clear that
Judge Easterbrook was particularly well-acquainted with the issues before the Seventh Circuit
in Bridenbaugh.
321. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
322. Id. Judge Easterbrook alluded that if he were forced to make a determination as to what
were the legitimate uses of Twenty-first Amendment power, that he would "follow the Supreme
Court rather than district courts and student notes." Id. In other words, he would follow the
Supreme Court's holding in North Dakota, that core purposes of the Twenty-first Amendment
include "promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue." North
Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 433 (1990); Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851.
323. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 851 ("[O]ur guide is the text and history of the Constitution.
not the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not have animated its drafters.").
324. Id. at 852.
325. Id. C'[S]tates could forbid domestic production of alcoholic beverages but could not stop





created by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Wilson Act in
Rhodes.328 Thus, the Twenty-first Amendment simply incorporated
the principles of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts into the Consti-
tution.
329
Judge Easterbrook began his analysis of the Indiana statute
by noting that Congress enacted Webb-Kenyon to permit states to
do precisely what Indiana did here-forbid the shipment of alcohol
directly to consumers. 330 Thus, the central issue was whether Indi-
ana placed an unconstitutional discriminatory condition upon the
importation of alcohol. Judge Easterbrook held that there was no
"functional discrimination."3 31 The condition placed on out-of-state
suppliers was exactly the same condition placed on in-state suppli-
ers-both had to sell their product to residents via a licensed in-
state wholesaler or they must posses a permit to ship directly to
Indiana residents. 332 In Judge Easterbrook's view, forcing all alco-
hol to pass through the three-tier distribution system allowed
"Indiana to collect its excise tax equally from in-state and out-of-
state sellers."333 In conclusion, Judge Easterbrook noted that if
Indiana were not permitted to force imported alcohol to pass
through its three-tier distribution system, then the "reverse dis-
crimination" problem that gave rise to the Wilson Act, the Webb-
Kenyon Act, and Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment would
reoccur.3 34 Indiana alcohol suppliers would be forced to send their
alcohol through the three-tier system and have their product sub-
jected to excise taxes while out-of-state suppliers would be allowed
to avoid the system and taxes by shipping directly to Indiana resi-
dents.33
5
Importantly, there was one issue related to the discrimina-
tory nature of Indiana's alcohol distribution scheme that the Sev-
enth Circuit opinion did not address. As Judge Easterbr6ok stated,
"holders of Indiana wine wholesaler or retailer permits may deliver
328. Id.
329. Id. at 853. Judge Easterbrook stated that in cases like Bacchus Imports and Brown-
Forman Distillers, the Supreme Court had employed these principles by developing an "unconsti.
tutional-conditions" approach to the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. In other words, the Twenty-
first Amendment gives states the power to place conditions and restrictions on the importation of
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directly to consumers' homes."3 3 6 ;Ee further noted, Indiana's statu-
tory scheme "apparently limits distribution permits to Indiana's
citizens." 337 If out-of-state suppliers cannot obtain these wholesaler
or retailer permits then the scheme seems to be plainly discrimina-
tory. Indeed, this was precisely the view that the Bridenbaugh dis-
trict court had taken. 338 Judge Easterbrook, however, did not per-
ceive this question to be before him because the plaintiffs in that
case were Indiana consumers; thus, he did not address the issue.3 39
Two district courts have decided cases involving direct ship-
ment laws since the Seventh Circuit decided Bridenbaugh.A4° The
first, Bainbridge v. Bush, involved a challenge to a Florida law that
prohibited out-of-state manufacturers or suppliers of alcohol to ship
their products directly to Florida persons other than those licensed
to receive such shipments. 34' Under the Florida scheme, in-state
wineries could obtain permits that would allow them to ship di-
rectly to customers in Florida; out-of-state vendors could not get
such permits.34 The court held that this system undoubtedly vio-
lated the dormant commerce clause by discriminating against the
out-of-state purveyors of alcohol.343 Next, the court turned to the
question of whether the Twenty-first Amendment saved the Florida
law from invalidation.3 " In addressing this issue, the court stated
that the Florida law, though discriminatory, would be valid if it
served the "core concerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment.345 Citing
North Dakota, the court held that the "core concerns" included not
just temperance, but also "raising revenue, and ensuring orderly
market conditions."346 The court found that the Florida law did
serve these core purposes and was thus saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment. 34
7
336. Id. at 853.
337. Id. at 854.
338. Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828, 832 (N.D. Ind. 1999) VCThe General As-
sembly of Indiana has chosen to discriminate as between in state (Indiana) and out-of-state
purveyors of alcoholic beverages."), rev'd sub non,. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848
(7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672 (2001).
339. Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 854. ("Plaintiffs do not complain about the statute that appar-
ently limits distribution permits to Indiana citizens. These plaintiffs are concerned only with
direct shipments from out-of-state sellers who lack and do not want Indiana permits.").
340. See Bolick v. Roberts, No. 99CV755, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11118 (E.D. Va. July 27,
2001); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (bMD. Fla. 2001).
341. Bainbridge, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (citing FLA. STAT. chs. 561.54, 561.545 (2000)).
342. Id. at 1311.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1312.
345. Id. at 1313.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 1315.
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An important difference exists between this decision and the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Bridenbaugh. In Bridenbaugh, Judge
Easterbrook made it clear that the Twenty-first Amendment did not
give states the power to discriminate against out-of-state purveyors
of alcohol. 348 Judge Easterbrook held that Indiana's law was consti-
tutional precisely because, in his view, it did not discriminate. 49
The aspect of the Indiana law that did discriminate-the provision
allowing permits only to in-state residents-was not being chal-
lenged in the case, according to Judge Easterbrook. 350 The Bain-
bridge court, however, specifically noted that the discriminatory
license provision in the Florida law was being challenged in its
case.8 51 Despite the law's discriminatory nature, the Bainbridge
court upheld the Florida direct shipment law. 5 2
The most recently decided direct shipment case involved a
Virginia law, similar to both the Florida and Indiana laws, which
prohibited the shipment of alcoholic beverages from out-of-state
producers directly to in-state customers. 58 Just as the Indiana and
Florida laws, the Virginia law also allowed in-state producers of
beer and wine to get a permit to ship directly to consumers in Vir-
ginia;354 however, unlike the Indiana and Florida laws, Virginia's
scheme did not allow in-state or out-of-state producers to get a
permit to ship distilled spirits directly to Virginia customers. In
Bolick v. Roberts, the Virginia district court held that the scheme as
it related to beer and wine clearly discriminated against out-of-
state producers, and therefore, violated the dormant commerce
clause. 355 Further, the court noted that, since the Seventh Circuit in
Bridenbaugh, had not addressed the issue of discriminatory per-
mits, Bridenbaugh was not dispositive. 356 Having found a violation
348. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2000) C'Section 2 thus au-
thorizes (direct shipment laws] unless the state has used its power to impose a discriminatory
condition on importation, one that favors Indiana sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in
other states, as Hawaii did in Bacchus."), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672 (2001).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 854. ("Plaintiffs do not complain about the statute that apparently limits distribu-
tion permits to Indiana's citizens. These plaintiffs are concerned only with direct shipments from
out-of-state sellers who lack and do not want Indiana permits.").
351. Bainbridge, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 C'[U]nlike the Seventh Circuit in Bridenbaugh, this
case requires a consideration of the impact of the discriminatory nature of the statutory scheme
on out-of-state wineries.").
352. Bolick v. Roberts, No. 99CV755, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11118, at *3, 24 (E.D. Va. July
27, 2001).
353. Id. at *24.
354. Id. at *3-4.
355. Id. at *42.
356. Id. at *41-42.
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of the dormant commerce clause by way of discrimination, the court
inquired into whether the Twenty-first Amendment saved the Vir-
ginia law as it related to beer and wine.35 7 The court found that
Virginia's direct shipment law did not further the legitimate objec-
tives of either promoting temperance or facilitating the collection of
taxes, and thus, was not saved by the Twenty-First Amendment.=
The court then considered the distilled spirits regulation. This law,
the court held, did not violate the dormant commerce clause be-
cause there was no discrimination-neither in-state nor out-of-state
producers could get a permit to ship distilled spirits directly to con-
sumers.359
Importantly, then, just as the courts in the Bridenbaugh and
Bainbridge cases focused on discrimination, so too does the Bolick
court. The primary difference, however, is that in Bolick and Bain-
bridge the courts found that the state's regulation was discrimina-
tory, then they considered whether the Twenty-first Amendment
saved the scheme despite its discrimination. In contrast, in Bri-
denbaugh Judge Easterbrook alludes that if a regulation is dis-
criminatory that is the end of inquiry-discriminatory statutes sim-
ply are not saved by the TIwenty-first Amendment because that
Amendment does not convey upon the states the power to discrimi-
nate. 360
C. The Supreme Court's Possible Approach to Direct Shipment Laws
The Supreme Court, under its method of analysis, might ad-
dress the direct shipment issue as follows. It seems clear that laws
prohibiting direct shipment in conjunction with residency require-
ments for licenses do violate the dormant commerce clause under
recent Supreme Court analysis-most notably the C & A Carbone
analysis. 36' The discrimination against out-of-state commerce is not
against out-of-state alcohol itself, but rather against the service of
distributing the alcohol. The three-tier system grants the right of
distribution to in-state wholesalers and retailers, while direct
357. Id. at *84.
358. See id. at *84-89.
359. Id. at *89-90.
360. Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 853 (7th Cir. 2000) (=Like the Wilson
Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act before Prohibition, § 2 enables a state to do to importation of liq-
uor-including direct deliveries to consumers in original packages-what it chooses to do to
internal sales of liquor, but nothing more.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct 1672
(2001).
361. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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shipment laws prohibit out-of-state suppliers of alcohol from par-
ticipating in the in-state distribution market. States may argue
that there is no discrimination because in-state alcohol suppliers
are forced to send their alcohol through the three-tiered distribu-
tion system just like out-of-state alcohol suppliers. The C & A Car-
bone case speaks directly to this argument. In C & A Carbone, the
Court held that though the town's action did not discriminate be-
tween in-state and out-of-state garbage, it did discriminate between
in-state and out-of-state firms in the business of processing gar-
bage. 36 2 Analogously, while there may not be discrimination be-
tween the actual products-the alcohol itself-the laws are still dis-
criminatory with respect to distribution because only in-state dis-
tributors may obtain wholesaler or retailer's permits.
Having established that direct shipment statutes that also
specify residency requirements violate the dormant commerce
clause, the Court then moves to the second tier to determine if the
Twenty-first Amendment saves the statute. 63 Using the three
methods described above, the Court's likely conclusion is not en-
tirely clear. There is little question that direct shipment laws sat-
isfy the power element. These laws are limited to "the State's cen-
tral power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the
times, places and manner under which liquor may be imported. 3 64
How the Court would apply the Bacchus Imports element, however,
is unclear. According to the court in Bacchus Imports, if the motiva-
tion of the legislature in passing a direct shipment law is protec-
tionism, then the statute does not have a legitimate purpose or
end. 365 Putting aside for the moment the inherent difficulty in de-
termining what motivates a legislature, the Bacchus Imports Court
held that only if a statute were designed to carry out a "clear con-
cern" of the Twenty-first Amendment would the statute be up-
held.366 In North Dakota, the Court alluded to the fact that Twenty-
first Amendment concerns included "promoting temperance, ensur-
ing orderly market conditions, and raising revenue." 367 Therefore, if
a state could show that the legislature's motivation was not the de-
362. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1994) C'[W]hat makes
garbage a profitable business is not its own worth but the fact that its possessor must pay to got
rid of it.... IT]he article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service
of processing and disposing of it.").
363. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
364. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 716 (1984).
365. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
366. Id.
367. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
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sire to protect in-state wholesaler/retailer interests, but rather to
raise revenue, then the statute would presumably be constitutional.
V. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the Court's Twenty-first Amendment Framework
This Note aims to critique the framework of the Court's
analysis and propose a new method of analysis for the future. The
central problem with the Court's current framework lies in the Bac-
chus Imports-style inquiry.38s Judge Easterbrook rightly rejected
using the legitimate ends inquiry,369 but failed to provide an expla-
nation for his rejection. This section will explain why the legitimate
ends analysis is flawed and why Judge Easterbrook was correct to
reject it.
The Bacchus Imports element poses a problem because it
forces courts to determine what legitimate ends a state may use
when exercising its Twenty-first Amendment power. Neither the
text of the Twenty-first Amendment nor its legislative history re-
veal what constitutes legitimate ends.370 The Supreme Court, lower
courts, and commentators have repeatedly noted that the legisla-
tive history does not adequately clarify what the Amendment was
precisely designed to do. 371 In the absence of any objective indica-
tion as to what constitutes the legitimate purposes of the Twenty-
first Amendment, a court can only offer subjective judicial specula-
tion regarding the Amendment's purpose.
For example, some lower courts have suggested that the only
legitimate end that may be sought by the use of Twenty-first
368. This inquiry requires courts to consider what constitutes the "core purposes of the
Twenty-first Amendment and to consider if, in passing the regulation at issue, the legislature
was motivated by a desire to accomplish a legitimate end. See supra notes 224-25 and accompa-
nying text.
369. In the opinion, Judge Easterbrook rejected the legitimate ends analysis by saying,
"[O]ur guide is the text and history of the Constitution, not the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may
or may not have animated its drafters." Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672 (2001).
370. As will be shown infra notes 372-93 and accompanying text, while it is not possible to
determine what constitutes a legitimate purpose according to the text and history, it is possible
to determine what constitutes a legitimate purpose from what is not indicated in the text and
history-namely that the legitimate purposes are not discrimination.
371. See supra notes 130-33.
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Amendment power is the promotion of temperance.37 2 Loretto Win-
ery is the central case cited for this proposition, but a close analysis
of the reasoning of that opinion reveals the weakness of its claims.
In Loretto Winery, the court began by analyzing the prohibition
movement, noting that prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, many
states allowed communities to decide for themselves through local
option whether to permit alcohol in their localities.373 From this
fact, the court concludes that Section 2 was included in the
Amendment "[t]o preserve this form of local option, and to restore
the regulatory powers which the states had exercised" with respect
to alcohol prior to Prohibition. 74 This is a reasonable conclusion
from the Amendment's history.375 The Loretto Winery court, how-
ever, leaps from this conclusion to the idea that Section 2 indicates
that temperance serves the only legitimate end of state regula-
tion.3 76 In the opinion, the court states "the language of the Twenty-
first Amendment and its legislative history demonstrate that Sec-
tion 2 of the Amendment was intended to restore to the states the
authority to promulgate local option temperance related con-
trols . . ... 377 Though the statement appears to rely on solid ground
for its temperance only conclusion-text and legislative history-
the court does not explain how the text and legislative history leads
to this conclusion. In the opinion, the court merely quotes the text
of Section 2 without analyzing its language.378 Moreover, the court
does not provide a single cite or reference to any legislative history
of the Twenty-first Amendment. Thus, the statement that the text
and history show that local option temperance was the point of Sec-
tion 2 is little more than a bald assertion. The court makes its final
leap to the conclusion that "[o]nly those state restrictions which
directly promote temperance may now be said to be permissible un-
der Section 2 . . . -379 In sum, the Loretto Winery court offers no ob-
jective support for its proposition; it only provides unsupported as-
sertions.
372. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 707-08 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Bridenbaugh v.
O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831 (N.D. Ind. 1999); Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazarra, 601 F.
Supp. 850, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
373. 601 F. Supp. at 856.
374. Id.
375. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
376. Loretto Winery, 601 F. Supp. at 861.
377. Id. at 859.
378. See id. at 856.
379. Id. at 861.
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The Supreme Court has fared no better in its attempt to de-
termine the legitimate uses of Twenty-first Amendment power. As
previously noted, the Court manifestly dodged the issue in Bacchus
Imports, stating only what did not constitute legitimate goals-
economic protectionism.3 80 The Court has made only one direct
statement regarding the issue when it posited in North Dakota that
"[i]n the interest of promoting temperance, ensuring orderly market
conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a com-
prehensive system for the distribution of liquor within its borders"
and stated that this "system is unquestionably legitimate."331 From
this statement, it appears that "promoting temperance, ensuring
orderly market conditions, and raising revenue" are all legitimate
state interests under the Twenty-first Amendment.38 2 The Court
does not, however, explain from where it derived the conclusion
that these three interests are legitimate concerns of the Twenty-
first Amendment. 383 These three things do not appear in the text of
the Amendment nor does the Court provide any legislative history
that shows these were the aims of Section 2. Furthermore, the
Court offers no historical background to the Amendment that might
lead one to believe these were in fact the purposes of the Amend-
ment. The Court cites only two cases, and neither of these cases
provides any further reasoning as to why these three ends or inter-
ests are legitimate for a state to pursue under the Twenty-first
Amendment. 384 One may reasonably ask if these "core purposes" are
from anywhere other than the judges themselves? The entire effort
to divine the core concerns or purposes is difficult at best, and en-
tirely dubious at worst.
Furthermore, even if courts could determine what legitimate
ends the Twenty-first Amendment permits state legislatures to
pursue, there is still another perhaps even more vexing problem
with the Bacchus Imports-style analysis. Under the Bacchus Im-
ports analysis, courts must determine if the legislature was moti-
vated by a desire to accomplish a legitimate end. This inquiry into
the motivation of the state legislature was relatively easy in Bac-
chus Imports because there was no dispute between the parties that
380. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 276 (1984) (CThe central purpose of the pro-
vision was not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competi-
tion.").
381. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990).
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. Id. (citing Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944) and Cal. Bd. of Equalization v.
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936)).
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the Hawaiian law was protectionist.3 85 Thus, there was no need to
divine the legislature's motive; both parties told the Court what
motivated the legislature.3 6 The problem with this analysis, how-
ever, is that rarely are courts presented with a situation in which
there is no dispute as to legislative purpose and motivation.
The inherent difficulty in assessing motivation behind a
statute cannot be overstated. Milton S. Kronheim & Co. v. District
of Columbia displays the difficulty of the task.38 7 In this case, the
court sought to determine the District of Columbia Council's moti-
vation for passing an ordinance that forbade liquor licensees in the
District to store their beverage inventory at warehouses outside the
District.388 The court recognized that it was entirely possible, maybe
even probable, that the District of Columbia Council was motivated
by protectionist concerns. 38 9 Implicitly recognizing that legislatures
are not motivated by only one single thing,3 90 and distinguishing
the case from Bacchus Imports, 391 the court held that the legislative
motivation also included legitimate concerns under the Twenty-first
Amendment. 392 Thus, the court upheld the ordinance. 93
Some commentators have suggested that public choice
analysis can help determine true legislative motivation for passing
direct shipment laws. 394 This argument focuses on the fact that
wholesalers and retailers have virtual monopolies in some states;
thus, they have a strong interest in legislation that restricts com-
petitors, like direct shipment laws. 395 Furthermore, states have
relatively few wholesalers and retailers, which enables them to or-
ganize easily.39 6 Thus, the public choice model suggests that these
groups will have a strong interest in, and be effective at, lobbying
385. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 271 C'[W]e need not guess at the legislature's motivation
for it is undisputed that the purpose of the exemption was to aid Hawaiian industry.").
386. Id.
387. 91 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
388. Id. at 195.
389. Id. at 203.
390. Id. ("Kronheim may colorably and even credibly argue that the District's local warehous-
ing requirement is protectionist. Indeed, we cannot say with any assuredness that protectionism
is not a purpose of the legislation. Nonetheless ... the legislative body acted with a mixed mo-
tive.").
391. Id.
392. The court noted that some of these legitimate concerns implicated by "requiring geo.
graphic proximity of warehouses" included "auditing company records, monitoring compliance
with the ABC laws, monitoring licenses, checking tax forms for audits." Id.
393. Id. at 204.
394. See Shanker, supra note 9, at 377-82.
395. Id. at 362.
396. Id. at 363.
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their local legislatures to pass laws that protect their interests. 39
From this, one can draw the conclusion that because of the strength
of the wholesaler lobby, it can be said with relative certainty that
legislatures are motivated to pass direct shipment laws by desires
to appease these influential lobby groups, i.e., to protect the in-
state wholesaler/retailer industry.39
8
While this public choice analysis may be persuasive in iden-
tifying that individual legislators are influenced by these lobbying
efforts, public choice analysis actually leads to an opposite conclu-
sion about the overall purpose of the entire legislature in passing a
law. 399 Public choice theorists assert that attempting to divine the
intent or motivation of the legislature as a whole is impossible.
400
There is no disputing that some legislators who vote to pass direct
shipment laws are motivated by the wholesaler interest groups, and
that these wholesaler groups are, for the most part, concerned pri-
marily with protecting their monopolies. It is not fair to say, how-
ever, that all legislators are motivated by these concerns. Perhaps
some legislators have a moral objection to alcohol and would vote
for any and all restrictions on alcohol shipment. Other legislators
may vote for the laws because they facilitate tax collection. Perhaps
other legislators are motivated by concerns about direct shipments
making it easier for minors to obtain alcohol. Even more, a single
legislator may have two separate motives for voting for a particular
statute.401 Public choice analysts say that determining a legisla-
ture's motivation is impossible to answer because a legislature is
not one single voice-it is comprised of many voices, many of which
are motivated to vote for a statute for entirely different reasons, or
maybe even no reason at all.402 Thus, to say the legislature, as a
whole, was motivated by this concern or that purpose is absurd.
Moreover, many judges and commentators would consider efforts to
397. Id.
398. Id. at 382 ("The superior ability to influence the political process possessed by in state
wholesalers/distributors and retailers should provide ample evidence that direct shipment laws
were passed for the purpose of economic protectionism.").
399. See EVAH. HANKS ET AL, ELEMENTS OF LAW 251 (1994) (asserting that a tenet of public
choice theory is that "[]egislation is an incoherent compromise, [ilts language is simply whatever
it took to get a majority on board, and 'legislative intent' does not exist").
400. See id.
401. See supra notes 386-92 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 398-99 and accompanying text; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (C[The Court's task is]
not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress-who need have nothing in mind in order for
their votes to be both lawful and effective... . "), overruled on other grounds by Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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determine the subjective intent or motivation behind any statute to
be entirely dubious.
40 3
B. Powers Not Purposes
As some Justices have suggested in dissenting opinions in
Twenty-first Amendment cases, the proper inquiry for courts is nei-
ther whether a state has used its Twenty-first Amendment power to
accomplish a legitimate goal, nor is it whether a state legislature
was motivated by this or that concern. 404 As shown above, answer-
ing either of these questions is immeasurably difficult. 405 The
proper issue for courts in determining the constitutionality of state
liquor regulation should be simply whether the regulation is within
a state's Twenty-first Amendment power. 406 That power can be
broadly defined as the power to control importation of alcohol into
the state.407 Justice Stevens asserted this position in his Bacchus
Imports dissent. 408 Justice O'Connor has also argued that courts
should constrain their focus to state power and should not concern
themselves with the wisdom or purposes of state regulation. 40 9 In
403. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV.
417, 417-19 (1899) ('[A statute] does not disclose one meaning conclusively according to the laws
of language. Thereupon we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in
the mouth of a normal speaker .... We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means."); see also Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) C'[The Coures task is] not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress-
who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful and effective .....
404. See infra notes 408-10.
405. See supra notes 369-92 and accompanying text.
406. See infra notes 408-10.
407. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984) (describing "the central
power reserved by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment [as] that of exercising 'control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution sys-
tem' ").
408. Justice Stevens stated, "It follows, according to the Court, that 'state laws that consti-
tute mere economic protectionism are not entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to com-
bat the perceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.' This is a totally novel approach to the
Twenty-first Amendment. The question is not one of 'deference,' nor one of 'central purpose'; the
question is whether the provision in this case is an exercise of a power expressly conferred upon
the States by the Constitution. It plainly is." Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 286-87
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
409. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 359-60 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
C'[ln a manner reminiscent of the long repudiated Lochner v. New York, the Court strikes down
the ABC Law because it concludes that the law was not 'effective' in preserving small retail es.
tablishments or in decreasing alcohol consumption. The proper inquiry, however, is not whether
the State of New York chose wisely in enacting a retail price maintenance law, nor whether the
State New York's motivation in doing so was linked to a 'central [pupose]' of the Twenty-first
Amendment. The sole 'question is whether the provision in this case is an exercise of a power
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their respective dissents, both Justice Stevens and Justice
O'Connor, along with Justice Rehnquist,410 have taken the position
originally taken by the Young's Market Court that the Twenty-first
Amendment entirely removed alcohol from the ambit of the dor-
mant commerce clause. 41' Thus, states may, pursuant to the
Twenty-first Amendment, favor in-state alcohol industries over out-
of-state alcohol industries. In other words, there is no restriction on
state discrimination against out-of-state liquor industries.
The position of Chief Justice Rehnquist and of Justices Ste-
vens and O'Connor in these dissents has much merit because it
does not force the Court to delve into the minds of state legislators
or to create unsupportable, subjective "core concerns" of the
Twenty-first Amendment. Their position, however, gives states free
reign to regulate alcohol without regard to any of the dormant
commerce clause principles. It is apparent from the text and history
of the laws behind the Twenty-first Amendment that this is not
what the Amendment sought to accomplish.
412
Judge Easterbrook, and perhaps Justice Scalia,413 have taken
a slightly different approach to the question of state power under
the Twenty-first Amendment. Their approach posits, like Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and O'Connor do in their dis-
sents, that the Twenty-first Amendment inquiry should focus on
powers rather than legislative motivation or core purposes and con-
cerns. 414 The crucial difference in the Judge EasterbrooklJustice
expressly conferred upon the States by the Constitution.' ") (quoting Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S.
at 287 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
410. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 349 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
("The Court in the present cases barely pays lipservice to the additional authority of the States to
regulate commerce and alcoholic beverages granted by the Twenty-first Amendment. Neglecting
to consider that increased authority is especially disturbing here where the perceived proscrip-
tive force of the Commerce Clause does not flow from an affirmative legislative decision and so is
at its nadir.).
411. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, stated this position
in his Bacchus Imports dissent- "Given the dual character of the [Commerce] Clause, it is not at
all incongruous to assume that the power delegated to Congress by the Commerce Clause is
unimpaired while holding the inherent limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on the
States is removed with respect to intoxicating liquors by the Twenty-first Amendment." 468 U.S.
at 279 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
412. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
413. Justice Scalia has never given a full explanation of his view of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, but in his concurrence in Healy, he alluded to a position similar to that of Judge Easter-
brook. See Healy, 491 U.S. at 344 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
414. In Bridenbaugh v. Freeman Wilson, Judge Easterbrook stated, "[O]ur guide is the text
and history of the Constitution, not the 'purposes' or 'concerns' that may or may not have ani-
mated its drafters. Objective indicators supply the context for § 2; suppositions about mental
2001] 2549
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Scalia view, however, is in the perception of what the Twenty-first
Amendment gives states the power to do. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Stevens, and Justice O'Connor believe that the power given
to states is unlimited by the dormant commerce clause whereas
Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia do see limits.
Justice Scalia has yet to provide a full explanation of his po-
sition on the topic, but in his concurrence in Healy, he alluded that,
under his view, states do not have the power to regulate alcohol in a
discriminatory manner. 415 He did not join the majority in Healy be-
cause he thought its analysis went further than necessary in decid-
ing the case. 416 For Justice Scalia, the inquiry should have started
and ended with the fact that the Connecticut law discriminated
against out-of-state alcohol. Under his view, a state regulation's
facially "discriminatory character eliminates the immunity afforded
by the Twenty-first Amendment. 417 As has been discussed, Judge
Easterbrook asserted essentially the same position in the Bri-
denbaugh case. 418
There is a sound and objective reason why the Twenty-first
Amendment simply does not give states the power to discriminate
against out-of-state alcohol industry. As the Supreme Court has
stated and as the legislative history makes clear, Section 2 of the
Twenty-first Amendment incorporated the approach of the pre-
Prohibition statutes-the Wilson Act and the Webb-Kenyon Act.419
The Wilson Act explicitly granted states the power to regulate out-
of-state alcohol "to the same extent" as in-state alcohol, and not the
power to regulate out-of-state alcohol industries in a discriminating
fashion.420 Webb-Kenyon followed, extending state power to regu-
processes are unilluminating." 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1672
(2001).
415. Healy, 491 U.S. at 344.
416. Id. at 345 C'I would refrain, however, from applying the more expansive analysis which
finds the law unconstitutional because it regulates or controls beer pricing .... [Tis rationale
is not only unnecessary but also questionable.").
417. Id. at 344.
418. 227 F.3d at 851.
419. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976) CThe wording of § 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment closely follows the Webb-Kenyon and Wilson Acts, expressing the framers' clear
intention of constitutionalizing the Commerce Clause framework established under those stat-
utes.").
420. Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (2000)) C'All
... intoxicating liquors.., transported into any State ... shall upon arrival in such State ... be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State ... to the same extent and in the
same manner as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such State."); see also Bri.
denbaugh, 227 F.3d at 852 (asserting that the Wilson Act did not permit states to discriminate
against out-of-state alcoholic beverage industries); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 100 (1897)
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late mail-order shipments. 42' Webb-Kenyon did not contain the
same language as the Wilson Act, which could indicate that Webb-
Kenyon did grant the power to discriminate. When Congress passed
Webb-Kenyon, however, they did not repeal the Wilson Act; thus, it
is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend for the non-
discrimination principle to be removed. Indeed, the Wilson Act's
restriction on discriminatory uses of state power is still law to-
day.422 Given this history, Judge Easterbrook rightly concludes that
the Twenty-first Amendment gives a state the power to regulate
alcohol in whatever way it sees fit, so long as the state regulates in
a way that does not discriminate against out-of-state alcohol indus-
tries.42
VI. CONCLUSION
A central part of the history of alcohol regulation has been
states' struggle to gain control over the sale of alcohol within their
borders. Early on, when states tried to place conditions on the sale
of alcohol, the Supreme Court, applying the dormant commerce
clause, frustrated states' efforts.42 4 Twice through congressional act
and once through constitutional amendment, America decided to
alter the principles of the dormant commerce clause and give states
the power to regulate the alcohol industry effectively. 42 These con-
gressional acts involved giving states the power to control the sale
of both in-state and imported alcoholic beverages. 426 As noted, many
states have chosen to control and regulate the sale and distribution
of alcohol by means of a three-tier system. A major aspect of the
three-tier system is that it requires wholesalers and retailers to
obtain licenses to participate in the alcohol distribution system. By
any account, the system of requiring alcohol to be distributed
through licensed wholesalers and retailers is "unquestionably le-
gitimate"428 because it is an exercise of precisely the power given to
states by the Twenty-first Amendment-the power "to control...
('IThe State cannot, under the [Wilson Act] establish a system which, in effect, discriminates
between interstate and domestic commerce.").
421. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text (discussing Webb.Kenyon Act).
422. See Wilson Act, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890) (current version at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1994)).
423. See Bridenbaugh, 227 F.3d at 853.
424. See supra notes 63-101.
425. See supra notes 80-88, 109-13, 126-29 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 80-88, 109-13, 126-29 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (describing three-tier system).
428. North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 433 (1990).
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whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to struc-
ture the liquor distribution system.
'4 29
While states are given broad authority under the Twenty-
first Amendment to structure their liquor distribution systems,
there are limitations on this power. It is important to understand
the scope of these limitations. Since Congress first started regulat-
ing alcohol, it has emphasized that while the states have broad
power to regulate both in-state alcohol industry and out-of-state
industries importing alcohol, states do not have the power to favor
the in-state alcohol industry.4 0 Thus, a state's power is limited by
the principle of nondiscrimination. A state's power is not, however,
limited to certain court-specified "legitimate purposes" beyond the
principle of nondiscrimination. As has been shown, court attempts
to limit state power to "legitimate purposes," such as the promotion
of temperance or ensuring orderly market conditions, suffer from
two problems. 43' First, these attempts require judges to make a sub-
jective determination regarding the core purposes of the Twenty-
first Amendment. 43 2 Second, the attempts further require judges to
delve into the minds of legislators to determine the purpose or mo-
tivation behind the state regulation.
433
Accepting the principle of nondiscrimination as the sole
Commerce Clause limitation on state power, the analysis of direct
shipment laws proceeds as follows. Most states have structured
their distribution systems such that there are only two ways an al-
cohol beverage supplier, whether in-state or out-of-state, can sell
alcohol to state consumers: either by obtaining a state license,4 4 or
by shipping the beverages through the state's three-tier system.
Direct shipment laws ensure that out-of-state suppliers cannot cir-
cumvent the license requirement, or the three-tier system, and sell
directly to consumers. State systems that regulate the distribution
of alcohol in this way are valid exercises of Twenty-first Amend-
ment power under the analysis this Note proposes. No discrimina-
tion exists because all out-of-state suppliers are simply forced to
429. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715 (1984) (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
430. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (describing the Wilson Act).
431. See supra notes 369-402 and accompanying text.
432. The determination is subjective because, as shown in supra notes 369-89 and accompa-
nying text, judges cannot point to objective textual evidence or legislative history to show what
the purposes of the Twenty-first Amendment are.
433. See supra notes 390-402 and accompanying text.
434. These licenses are either wholesaler's or retailer's licenses.
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comply with the same conditions for selling alcohol as in-state sup-
pliers.
Some state distribution systems, however, go too far. Some
state distribution schemes are discriminatory in that licenses are
granted only to in-state residents.435 These residency requirements
clearly violate the principle of non-discrimination established in the
Wilson Act and incorporated into the Twenty-first Amendment, and
thus, are not within states' Twenty-first Amendment power-
regardless of whether these statutes promote temperance, aid in
the collection of taxes, or provide for an orderly market.436
In sum, this Note argues that a state, under its Twenty-first
Amendment power, may prohibit out-of-state alcohol distributors
from shipping alcoholic beverages directly to consumers, if that
state also prohibits in-state alcohol distributors from shipping di-
rectly to consumers. Furthermore, a state, under its Twenty-first
Amendment power, may require that distributors obtain a license
before selling alcohol to citizens of the state; however, a state may
not issue those licenses only to in-state distributors.
Russ Miller*
435. The Indiana alcohol distribution scheme provides an excellent example of this type of
discrimination. See supra notes 309-19 and accompanying text. For a list of other states that
impose residency restrictions on the granting of licenses, see supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
436. Cf. Cooper v. McBeath, 11 F.3d 547, 555 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a Texas law that re-
stricted mixed beverage permits to in-state residents unconstitutional).
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